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Abstract
This paper studies a model of long-term contracting for experimentation. We consider a
principal-agent relationship with adverse selection on the agent’s ability, dynamic moral haz-
ard, and private learning about project quality. We find that each of these elements plays an
essential role in structuring dynamic incentives, and it is only their interaction that generally
precludes efficiency. Our model permits an explicit characterization of optimal contracts.
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1. Introduction
Agents need to be incentivized to work on, or experiment with, projects of uncertain feasibility. Par-
ticularly with uncertain projects, agents are likely to have some private information about their project-
specific skills.1 Incentive design must deal with not only dynamic moral hazard, but also adverse selection
(pre-contractual hidden information) and the inherent process of learning. To date, there is virtually no
theoretical work on contracting in such settings. How well can a principal incentivize an agent? How do
the environment’s features affect the shape of optimal incentive contracts? What distortions, if any, arise?
An understanding is relevant not only for motivating research and development, but also for diverse
applications like contract farming, technology adoption, and book publishing, as discussed subsequently.
This paper provides an analysis using a simple model of experimentation. We show that the inter-
action of learning, adverse selection, and moral hazard introduces new conceptual and analytical issues,
with each element playing a role in structuring dynamic incentives. Their interaction affects social effi-
ciency: the principal typically maximizes profits by inducing an agent of low ability to end experimen-
tation inefficiently early, even though there would be no distortion without either adverse selection or
moral hazard. Furthermore, despite the intricacy of the problem, intuitive contracts are optimal. The
principal can implement the second best by selling the project to the agent and committing to buy back
output at time-dated future prices; these prices must increase over time in a manner calibrated to deal
with moral hazard and learning.
Our model builds on the now-canonical two-armed “exponential bandit” version of experimentation
(Keller, Rady, and Cripps, 2005).2 The project at hand may either be good or bad. In each period, the
agent privately chooses whether to exert effort (work) or not (shirk). If the agent works in a period and
the project is good, the project is successful in that period with some probability; if either the agent shirks
or the project is bad, success cannot obtain in that period. In the terminology of the experimentation
literature, working on the project in any period corresponds to “pulling the risky arm”, while shirking
is “pulling the safe arm”; the opportunity cost of pulling the risky arm is the effort cost that the agent
incurs. Project success yields a fixed social surplus, accrued by the principal, and obviates the need for
any further effort. We introduce adverse selection by assuming that the probability of success in a period
(conditional on the agent working and the project being good) depends on the agent’s ability—either high
or low—which is the agent’s ex-ante private information or type. Our baseline model assumes no other
contracting frictions, in particular we set aside limited liability and endow the principal with full ex-ante
commitment power: she maximizes profits by designing a menu of contracts to screen the agent’s ability.3
1 Other forms of private information, such as beliefs about the project feasibility or personal effort costs, are also
relevant; see Subsection 7.4.
2 As surveyed by Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2008), learning is often modeled in economics as an experimentation
or bandit problem since Rothschild (1974).
3 Subsection 7.2 studies the implications of limited liability. The importance of limited liability varies across
applications; we also view it as more insightful to separate its effects from those of adverse selection.
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Since beliefs about the project’s quality decline so long as effort has been exerted but success not ob-
tained, the first-best or socially efficient solution is characterized by a stopping rule: the agent keeps work-
ing (so long as he has not succeeded) up until some point at which the project is permanently abandoned.
An important feature for our analysis is that the efficient stopping time is a non-monotonic function of the
agent’s ability. The intuition stems from two countervailing forces: on the one hand, for any given belief
about the project’s quality, a higher-ability agent provides a higher marginal benefit of effort because he
succeeds with a higher probability; on the other hand, a higher-ability agent also learns more from the
lack of success over time, so at any point he is more pessimistic about the project than the low-ability
agent. Hence, depending on parameter values, the first-best stopping time for a high-ability agent may
be larger or smaller than that of a low-ability agent (cf. Bobtcheff and Levy, 2015).
Turning to the second best, the key distinguishing feature of our setting from a canonical (static) ad-
verse selection problem is the dynamic moral hazard and its interaction with the agent’s private learning.
Recall that in a standard buyer-seller adverse selection problem, there is no issue about what quantity the
agent of one type would consume if he were to deviate and take the other type’s contract: it is simply
the quantity specified by the chosen contract. By contrast, in our setting, it is not a priori clear what “con-
sumption bundle”, i.e. effort profile, each agent type will choose after such an off-the-equilibrium path
deviation. Dealing with this problem would not pose any conceptual difficulty if there were a systematic
relationship between the two types’ effort profiles, for instance if there were a “single-crossing condition”
ensuring that the high type always wants to experiment at least as long as the low type. However, given
the nature of learning, there is no such systematic relationship in an arbitrary contract. As effort off the
equilibrium path is crucial when optimizing over the menu of contracts—because it affects how much
“information rent” the agent gets—and the contracts in turn influence the agent’s off-path behavior, we
are faced with a non-trivial fixed point problem.
Theorem 2 establishes that the principal optimally screens the agent types by offering two distinct
contracts, each inducing the agent to work for some amount of time (so long as success has not been ob-
tained) after which the project is abandoned. Compared to the social optimum, an inefficiency typically
obtains: while the high-ability type’s stopping time is efficient, the low-ability type experiments too little.
This result is reminiscent of the familiar “no distortion at the top but distortion below” in static adverse
selection models, but the distortion arises here only from the conjunction of adverse selection and moral
hazard; we show that absent either one, the principal would implement the first best (Theorem 1). More-
over, because of the aforementioned lack of a single-crossing property, it is not immediate in our setting
that the principal shouldn’t have the low type over-experiment to reduce the high type’s information rent,
particularly when the first best entails the high type stopping earlier than the low type.
Theorem 2 is indirect in the sense that it establishes the (in)efficiency result without elucidating the
form of second-best contracts. Our methodology to characterize such contracts distinguishes between the
two orderings of the first-best stopping times. We first study the case in which the efficient stopping time
for a high-ability agent is larger than that of a low-ability agent. Here we show that although there is no
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analog of the single-crossing condition mentioned above in an arbitrary contract, such a condition must
hold in an optimal contract for the low type. This allows us to simplify the problem and fully characterize
the principal’s solution (Theorem 3 and Theorem 4). The case in which the first-best stopping time for
the high-ability agent is lower than that of the low-ability agent proves to be more challenging: now, as
suggested by the first best, an optimal contract for the low type is often such that the high type would
experiment less than the low type should he take this contract. We are able to fully characterize the
solution in this case under no discounting (Theorem 5 and Theorem 6).
The second-best contracts we characterize take simple and intuitive forms, partly owing to the simple
underlying primitives. In any contract that stipulates experimentation for T periods it suffices to consider
at most T + 1 transfers. The reason is that the parties share a common discount factor and there are
T + 1 possible project outcomes: a success can occur in each of the T periods or never. One class of
contracts are bonus contracts: the agent pays the principal an up-front fee and is then rewarded with
a bonus that depends on when the project succeeds (if ever). We characterize the unique sequence of
time-dependent bonuses that must be used in an optimal bonus contract for the low-ability type.4 This
sequence is increasing over time up until the termination date. The shape, and its exact calibration, arises
from a combination of the agent becoming more pessimistic over time (absent earlier success) and the
principal’s desire to avoid any slack in the provision of incentives, while crucially taking into account
that the agent can substitute his effort across time.
The optimal bonus contract can be viewed as a simple “sale-with-buyback contract”: the principal
sells the project to the agent at the outset for some price, but commits to buy back the project’s output (that
obtains with a success) at time-dated future prices. It is noteworthy that contract farming arrangements,
widely used in developing countries between agricultural companies and farm producers (Barrett et al.,
2012), are often sale-with-buyback contracts: the company sells seeds or other technology (e.g., fertilizers
or pesticides) to the farmer and agrees to buy back the crop at pre-determined prices, conditional on this
output meeting certain quality standards and delivery requirements (Minot, 2007). The contract farming
setting involves a profit-maximizing firm (principal) and a farmer (agent). Miyata, Minot, and Hu (2009)
describe the main elements of these environments, focusing on the case of China. It is initially unknown
whether the new seeds or technology will produce the desired outcomes in a particular farm, which
maps into our project uncertainty.5 Besides the evident moral hazard problem, there is also adverse
selection: farmers differ in unobservable characteristics, such as industriousness, intelligence, and skills.6
Our analysis not only shows that sale-with-buyback contracts are optimal in the presence of uncertainty,
moral hazard, and unobservable heterogeneity, but elucidates why. Moreover, as discussed further in
4 For the high type, there are multiple optimal contracts even within a given class such as bonus contracts.
The reason for the asymmetry is that the low type’s contract is pinned down by information rent minimization
considerations, unlike the high type’s contract. Of course, the high type’s contract cannot be arbitrary either.
5 Besley and Case (1993) study how farmers learn about a new technology over time given the realization of
yields from past planting decisions, and how they in turn make dynamic choices.
6 Beaman et al. (2015) provide evidence of such unobservable characteristics using a field experiment in Mali.
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Subsection 5.3, our paper offers implications for the design of such contracts and for field experiments on
technology adoption more broadly. In particular, field experiments might test our predictions regarding
the rich structure of optimal bonus contracts and how the calibration depends on underlying parameters.7
Another class of optimal contracts that we characterize are penalty contracts: the agent receives an up-
front payment and is then required to pay the principal some time-dependent penalty in each period in
which a success does not obtain, up until either the project succeeds or the contract terminates.8 Analo-
gous to the optimal bonus contract, we identify the unique sequence of penalties that must be used in an
optimal penalty contract for the low-ability type: the penalty increases over time with a jump at the ter-
mination date. These types of contracts correspond to those used, for example, in arrangements between
publishers and authors: authors typically receive advances and are then required to pay the publisher
back if they do not succeed in completing the book by a given deadline (Owen, 2013). This application
fits into our framework when neither publisher nor author may initially be sure whether a commercially-
viable book can be written in the relevant timeframe (uncertain project feasibility); the author will have
superior information about his suitability or comparative advantage in writing the book (adverse selec-
tion about ability); and how much time he actually devotes to the task is unobservable (moral hazard).9
Our results have implications for the extent of experimentation and innovation across different eco-
nomic environments. An immediate prediction concerns the effects of asymmetric information: we find
that environments with more asymmetric information (either moral hazard or adverse selection) should
feature less experimentation, lower success rates, and more dispersion of success rates. We also find that
the relationship between success rates and the underlying environment can be subtle. Absent any dis-
tortions, “better environments” lead to more innovation. Specifically, an increase in the proportion of
high-ability agents or an increase in the ability of both types of the agent yields a higher probability of
success in the first best. In the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection, however, the opposite can
be true: these changes can induce the principal to distort the low-ability type’s experimentation by more,
to the extent that the average success probability goes down in the second best. Consequently, observing
higher innovation rates in contractual settings like those we study is neither necessary nor sufficient to
deduce a better underlying environment. As discussed in Subsection 5.3, these results may contribute an
agency-theoretic component to the puzzle of low technology adoption rates in developing countries.
Related literature. Broadly, this paper fits into literatures on long-term contracting with either dynamic
7 We should highlight that our paper is not aimed at studying all the institutional details of contract farming or
technology adoption. For example, we do not address multi-agent experimentation and social learning, which has
been emphasized by the empirical literature (e.g., Conley and Udry, 2010).
8 There is a flavor here of “clawbacks” that are sometimes used in practice when an agent is found to be negligent.
In our setting, it is the lack of project success that is treated like evidence of negligence (i.e. shirking); note, however,
that in equilibrium the principal knows that the agent is not actually negligent.
9 Not infrequently, authors fail to deliver in a timely fashion (Suddath, 2012). That private information can be
a substantive issue is starkly illustrated by the case of Herman Rosenblat, whose contract with Penguin Books to
write a Holocaust survivor memoir was terminated when it was discovered that he fabricated his story.
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moral hazard and/or adverse selection. Few papers combine both elements, but two recent excep-
tions are Sannikov (2007) and Gershkov and Perry (2012).10 These papers are not concerned with learn-
ing/experimentation and their settings and focus differ from ours in many ways.11 More narrowly, start-
ing with Bergemann and Hege (1998, 2005), there is a fast-growing literature on contracting for experimen-
tation. Virtually all existing research in this area addresses quite different issues than we do, primarily
because adverse selection is not accounted for.12 The only exception we are aware of is the concurrent
work of Gomes, Gottlieb, and Maestri (2015). They do not consider moral hazard; instead, they introduce
two-dimensional adverse selection. Under some conditions they obtain an “irrelevance result” on the
dimension of adverse selection that acts similar to our agent’s ability, a conclusion that is similar to our
benchmark that the first best obtains in our model when there is no moral hazard.
Outside a pure experimentation framework, Gerardi and Maestri (2012) analyze how an agent can
be incentivized to acquire and truthfully report information over time using payments that compare the
agent’s reports with the ex-post observed state; by contrast, we assume the state is never observed when
experimentation is terminated without a success. Finally, our model can also be interpreted as a problem
of delegated sequential search, as in Lewis and Ottaviani (2008) and Lewis (2011). The main difference is
that, in our context, these papers assume that the project’s quality is known and hence there is no learning
about the likelihood of success (cf. Subsection 7.3); moreover, they do not have adverse selection.
2. The Model
Environment. A principal needs to hire an agent to work on a project. The project’s quality—synonymous
with the state—may either be good or bad, a binary variable. Both parties are initially uncertain about
the project’s quality; the common prior on the project being good is β0 ∈ (0, 1). The agent is privately
informed about whether his ability is low or high, θ ∈ {L,H}, where θ = H represents “high”. The
principal’s prior on the agent’s ability being high is µ0 ∈ (0, 1). In each period, t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, the agent
can either exert effort (work) or not (shirk); this choice is never observed by the principal. Exerting effort
10 Some earlier papers with adverse selection and dynamic moral hazard, such as Laffont and Tirole (1988), focus
on the effects of short-term contracting. There is also a literature on dynamic contracting with adverse selection and
evolving types but without moral hazard or with only one-shot moral hazard, such as Baron and Besanko (1984) or,
more recently, Battaglini (2005), Boleslavsky and Said (2013), and Eso˝ and Szentes (2015). Pavan, Segal, and Toikka
(2014) provide a rather general treatment of dynamic mechanism design without moral hazard.
11 Demarzo and Sannikov (2011), He et al. (2014), and Prat and Jovanovic (2014) study private learning in moral-
hazard models following Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1987), but do not have adverse selection. Sannikov (2013) also
proposes a Brownian-motion model and a first-order approach to deal with moral hazard when actions have long-
run effects, which raises issues related to private learning. Chassang (2013) considers a general environment and
develops an approach to find detail-free contracts that are not optimal but instead guarantee some efficiency bounds
so long as there is a long horizon and players are patient.
12 See Bonatti and Ho¨rner (2011, 2015), Manso (2011), Klein (2012), Ederer (2013), Ho¨rner and Samuelson (2013),
Kwon (2013), Guo (2014), Halac, Kartik, and Liu (2015), and Moroni (2015).
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in any period costs the agent c > 0. If effort is exerted and the project is good, the project is successful in
that period with probability λθ; if either the agent shirks or the project is bad, success cannot obtain in that
period. Success is observable and once a project is successful, no further effort is needed.13 We assume
1 > λH > λL > 0. A success yields the principal a payoff normalized to 1; the agent does not intrinsically
care about project success. Both parties are risk neutral, have quasi-linear preferences, share a common
discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1], and are expected-utility maximizers.
Contracts. We consider contracting at period zero with full commitment power from the principal. To
deal with the agent’s hidden information at the time of contracting, the principal’s problem is, without
loss of generality, to offer the agent a menu of dynamic contracts from which the agent chooses one. A
dynamic contract specifies a sequence of transfers as a function of the publicly observable history, which
is simply whether or not the project has been successful to date. To isolate the effects of adverse selection,
we do not impose any limited liability constraints until Subsection 7.2. We assume that once the agent
has accepted a contract, he is free to work or shirk in any period up until some termination date that is
specified by the contract.14 Throughout, we follow the convention that transfers are from the principal to
the agent; negative values represent payments in the other direction.
Formally, a contract is given byC = (T,W0, b, l), where T ∈ N ≡ {0, 1, . . .} is the termination date of the
contract,W0 ∈ R is an up-front transfer (or wage) at period zero, b = (b1, . . . , bT ) specifies a transfer bt ∈ R
made at period t conditional on the project being successful in period t, and analogously l = (l1, . . . , lT )
specifies a transfer lt ∈ R made at period t conditional on the project not being successful in period t (nor
in any prior period).15,16 We refer to any bt as a bonus and any lt as a penalty. Note that bt is not constrained
to be positive nor must lt be negative; however, these cases will be focal and hence our choice of termi-
nology. Without loss of generality, we assume that if T > 0 then T = max{t : either bt 6= 0 or lt 6= 0}. The
agent’s actions are denoted by a = (a1, . . . , aT ), where at = 1 if the agent works in period t and at = 0 if
the agent shirks.
Payoffs. The principal’s expected discounted payoff at time zero from a contract C = (T,W0, b, l), an
13 Subsection 7.1 establishes that our results apply without change if success is privately observed by the agent
but can be verifiably disclosed.
14 There is no loss of generality here. If the principal has the ability to block the agent from choosing whether to
work in some period—“lock him out of the laboratory”, so to speak—this can just as well be achieved by instead
stipulating that project success in that period would trigger a large payment to the principal.
15 We thus restrict attention to deterministic contracts. Throughout, symbols in bold typeface denote vectors. W0
and T are redundant because W0 can be effectively induced by suitable modifications to b1 and l1, while T can be
effectively induced by setting bt = lt = 0 for all t > T . However, it is expositionally convenient to include these
components explicitly in defining a contract. Furthermore, there is no loss in assuming that T ∈ N; as we show, it is
always optimal for the principal to stop experimentation at a finite time, so she cannot benefit from setting T =∞.
16 As the principal and agent share a common discount factor, what matters is only the mapping from outcomes
to transfers, not the dates at which transfers are made. Our convention facilitates our exposition.
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agent of type θ, and a sequence of the agent’s actions a is denoted Πθ0(C,a), which can be computed as:




















Formula (1) is understood as follows. W0 is the up-front transfer made from the principal to the agent.
With probability 1 − β0 the state is bad, in which case the project never succeeds and hence the entire
sequence of penalties l is transferred. Conditional on the state being good (which occurs with proba-





is the probability that a success does not obtain between period 1 and t − 1 conditional on
the good state. If the project were to succeed at time t, then the principal would earn a payoff of 1 in that
period, and the transfers would be the sequence of penalties (l1, . . . , lt−1) followed by the bonus bt.
Through analogous reasoning, bearing in mind that the agent does not directly value project success
but incurs the cost of effort, the agent’s expected discounted payoff at time zero given his type θ, contract
C, and action profile a is
U θ0 (C,a) := W0 +(1−β0)
T∑
t=1




















If a contract is not accepted, both parties’ payoffs are normalized to zero.
Bonus and penalty contracts. Our analysis will make use of two simple classes of contracts. A bonus
contract is one where aside from any initial transfer there is at most only one other transfer, which occurs
when the agent obtains a success. Formally, a bonus contract isC = (T,W0, b, l) such that lt = 0 for all t ∈
{1, . . . , T}. A bonus contract is a constant-bonus contract if, in addition, there is some constant b such that
bt = b for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. When the context is clear, we denote a bonus contract as just C = (T,W0, b)
and a constant-bonus contract as C = (T,W0, b). By contrast, a penalty contract is one where the agent
receives no payments for success and instead is penalized for failure. Formally, a penalty contract is
C = (T,W0, b, l) such that bt = 0 for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. A penalty contract is a onetime-penalty contract if,
in addition, lt = 0 for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}. That is, while in a general penalty contract the agent may
be penalized for each period in which he fails to obtain a success, in a onetime-penalty contract the agent
is penalized only if a success does not obtain by the termination date T . We denote a penalty contract as
just C = (T,W0, l) and a onetime-penalty contract as C = (T,W0, lT ).
Although each of these two classes of contracts will be useful for different reasons, there is an iso-
morphism between them; furthermore, either class is “large enough” in a suitable sense. More precisely,
say that two contracts, C = (T,W0, b, l) and Ĉ = (T, Ŵ0, b̂, l̂), are equivalent if for all θ ∈ {L,H} and
a = (a1, . . . , aT ): U θ0 (C,a) = U
θ
0 (Ĉ,a) and Π
θ




Proposition 1. For any contract C = (T,W0, b, l) there exist both an equivalent penalty contract Ĉ = (T, Ŵ0, l̂)
and an equivalent bonus contract C˜ = (T, W˜0, b˜).
Proof. See the Supplementary Appendix. Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 implies that it is without loss to focus either on bonus contracts or on penalty contracts.
The proof is constructive: given an arbitrary contract, it explicitly derives equivalent penalty and bonus
contracts. The intuition is that all that matters in any contract is the induced vector of discounted trans-
fers for success occurring in each possible period (and never), and these transfers can be induced with
bonuses or penalties.17 The proof also shows that when δ = 1, onetime-penalty contracts are equivalent
to constant-bonus contracts.
3. Benchmarks
3.1. The first best
Consider the first-best solution, i.e. when the agent’s type θ is commonly known and his effort in each
period is publicly observable and contractible. Since beliefs about the state being good decline so long
as effort has been exerted but success not obtained, the first-best solution is characterized by a stopping
rule such that an agent of ability θ keeps exerting effort so long as success has not obtained up until some
period tθ, whereafter effort is no longer exerted.18 Let βθt be a generic belief on the state being good at the
beginning of period t (which will depend on the history of effort), and βθt be this belief when the agent

















β0 (1− λθ)t−1 + (1− β0)
. (4)
17 For example, in a two-period contractC = (2,W0, b, l), the agent’s discounted transfer isW0+δb1 if he succeeds
in period one, W0 + δl1 + δ2b2 if he succeeds in period two, and W0 + δl1 + δ2l2 if he does not succeed in either
period. The same transfers are induced by a penalty contract Ĉ = (2, Ŵ0, l̂) with Ŵ0 = W0 + δb1, l̂1 = l1 − b1 + δb2,
and l̂2 = l2−b2, and by a bonus contract C˜ = (2, W˜0, b˜) with W˜0 = W0 +δl1 +δ2l2, b˜1 = b1− l1−δl2, and b˜2 = b2− l2.
18 More precisely, the first best can always be achieved using a stopping rule for each type; when and only when
δ = 1, there are other rules that also achieve the first best. Without loss, we focus on stopping rules.
8
Note that (3) is only well-defined when c ≤ β0λθ; if c > β0λθ, it would be efficient to not experiment
at all, i.e. stop at tθ = 0. To focus on the most interesting cases, we assume:
Assumption 1. Experimentation is efficient for both types: for θ ∈ {L,H}, β0λθ > c.
If parameter values are such that βθtθλθ = c,19 equations (3) and (4) can be combined to derive the
following closed-form solution for the first-best stopping time for type θ:








log (1− λθ) . (5)
Equation (5) yields intuitive monotonicity of the first-best stopping time as a function of the prior that
the project is good, β0, and the cost of effort, c.20 But it also implies a fundamental non-monotonicity
as a function of the agent’s ability, λθ, as shown in Figure 1. (For simplicity, the figure ignores integer
constraints on tθ.) This stems from the interaction of two countervailing forces. On the one hand, for any
given belief about the state, the expected marginal benefit of effort is higher when the agent’s ability is
higher; on the other hand, the higher is the agent’s ability, the more informative is a lack of success in
a period in which he works. Hence, at any time t > 1, a higher-ability agent is more pessimistic about
the state (given that effort has been exerted in all prior periods), which has the effect of decreasing the
expected marginal benefit of effort. Altogether, this makes the first-best stopping time non-monotonic in
ability; both tH > tL and tH < tL are robust possibilities that arise for different parameters. As we will
see, this has substantial implications.














3.2. No adverse selection or no moral hazard
Our model has two sources of asymmetric information: adverse selection and moral hazard. To see that
their interaction is essential, it is useful to understand what would happen in the absence of either one.
Consider first the case without adverse selection, i.e. assume the agent’s ability is observable but there
is moral hazard. The principal can then use a constant-bonus contract to effectively sell the project to the
agent at a price that extracts all the (ex-ante) surplus. Specifically, suppose the principal offers the agent
19 We do not assume this condition in our analysis, but it is convenient for the current discussion.
20 One may also notice that the discount factor, δ, does not enter (5). In other words, unlike the traditional focus
of experimentation models, there is no tradeoff here between “exploration” and “exploitation”, as the first-best
strategy is invariant to patience. Our model and subsequent analysis can be generalized to incorporate this tradeoff,
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t is belief on good state at beginning of t given work up to t
Assumption 1. Experimentation is e cient: for ✓ 2 {L,H},  0 ✓ > c.
Note both tH > tL and tH < tL are robust possibilities
! Productivity vs. learning e↵ects:
• For given belief on good state, marginal benefit of e↵ort higher for H
• But at any point in time, given no success, belief lower for H
Model – Environment (2)
In each period t 2 {1, 2, . . .}, agent covertly chooses to work or shirk
• Exerting e↵ort in any period costs the agent c > 0
If agent works and state is good, project succeeds with probability  ✓
• 1 >  H >  L > 0
If agent shirks or state is bad, success cannot obtain
Project success yields principal payo↵ normalized to 1
• No further e↵ort once success is obtained
Project success is publicly observable
• Results also hold if privately observed by agent but verifiable disclosure
Figure 1 – The first-best stopping time.
of type θ a constant-bonus contract Cθ = (tθ,W θ0 , 1), where W
θ
0 is chosen so that conditional on the agent
exerting effort in each period up to the first-best termination date (as long as success has not obtained),


















+W θ0 = 0,
where the notation 1 denotes th action profile of w rking in every period of the contract. Plainly, this
contract makes the agent fully internalize the social value of success and hence achieves the first-best level
of experimentation, while the principal keeps all the surplus.
Consider next the case with adverse selection but no moral hazard: the agent’s effort in any period
still costs him c > 0 but is observable and contractible. The principal can then implement the first best
and extract all the surplus by using simple contracts that pay the agent for effort rather than outcomes.
Specifically, the principal can offer the agent a choice between two contracts that involve no bonuses or
penalties, with each paying the agent c for every period that he works. The termination date is tL in the
contract intended for the low type and tH in the contract intended for the high type. Plainly, the agent’s
payoff is zero regardless of his type and which contract and effort profile he chooses. Hence, the agent
is willing to choose the contract intended for his type and work until either a success is obtained or the
termination date is reached.21
To summarize:
21 The same idea underlies Gomes et al.’s (2015) Lemma 2. While this mechanism makes the agent indifferent
over the contracts, there are more sophisticated optimal mechanisms, detailed in earlier versions of our paper, that
satisfy the agent’s self-selection constraint strictly.
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Theorem 1. If there is either no moral hazard or no adverse selection, the principal optimally implements the first
best and extracts all the surplus.
A proof is omitted in light of the simple arguments preceding the theorem. Theorem 1 also holds when
there are many types; that both kinds of information asymmetries are essential to generate distortions is
general in our experimentation environment.22
4. Second-Best (In)Efficiency
We now turn to the setting with both moral hazard and adverse selection. In this section, we formalize
the principal’s problem and deduce the nature of second-best inefficiency. We provide explicit character-
izations of optimal contracts in Section 5 and Section 6.
Without loss, we assume that the principal specifies a desired effort profile along with a contract.
An optimal menu of contracts maximizes the principal’s ex-ante expected payoff subject to incentive
compatibility constraints for effort (ICθa below), participation constraints (IRθ below), and self-selection
constraints for the agent’s choice of contract (ICθθ
′
below). Denote
αθ (C) := arg max
a
U θ0 (C,a)
as the set of optimal action plans for the agent of type θ under contract C. With a slight abuse of notation,
we will write U θ0 (C,α














subject to, for all θ, θ′ ∈ {L,H},
aθ ∈ αθ(Cθ), (ICθa)
U θ0 (C
θ,aθ) ≥ 0, (IRθ)
U θ0 (C







Adverse selection is reflected in the self-selection constraints (ICθθ
′
), as is familiar. Moral hazard is
reflected directly in the constraints (ICθa) and also indirectly in the constraints (ICθθ
′
) via the termαθ(Cθ
′
).
To get a sense of how these matter, consider the agent’s incentive to work in some period t. This is shaped
not only by the transfers that are directly tied to success/failure in period t (bt and lt) but also by the
22 We note that learning is also important in generating distortions: in the absence of learning (i.e. if the project
were known to be good, β0 = 1), the principal may again implement the first best. For expositional purposes, we
defer this discussion to Subsection 7.3.
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transfers tied to subsequent outcomes, through their effect on continuation values. In particular, ceteris
paribus, raising the continuation value (say, by increasing either bt+1 or lt+1) makes reaching period t + 1
more attractive and hence reduces the incentive to work in period t: this is a dynamic agency effect.23
Note moreover that the continuation value at any point in a contract depends on the agent’s type and his
effort profile; hence it is not sufficient to consider a single continuation value at each period. Furthermore,
besides having an effect on continuation values, the agent’s type also affects current incentives for effort
because the expected marginal benefit of effort in any period differs for the two types. Altogether, the
optimal plan of action will generally be different for the two types of the agent, i.e. for an arbitrary contract
C, we may have αH(C) ∩αL(C) = ∅.24
Our result on second-best (in)efficiency is as follows:
Theorem 2. In any optimal menu of contracts, each type θ ∈ {L,H} is induced to work for some number of
periods, tθ. Relative to the first-best stopping times, tH and tL, the second best has tH = tH and tL ≤ tL.
Proof. See Appendix A. Q.E.D.
Theorem 2 says that relative to the first best, there is no distortion in the amount of experimentation by
the high-ability agent whereas the low-ability agent may be induced to under-experiment. It is interesting
that this is a familiar “no distortion (only) at the top” result from static models of adverse selection, even
though the inefficiency arises here from the conjunction of adverse selection and dynamic moral hazard
(cf. Theorem 1). Moral hazard generates an “information rent” for the high type but not for the low
type. As will be elaborated subsequently, reducing the low type’s amount of experimentation allows the
principal to reduce the high type’s information rent. The optimal tL trades off this information rent with
the low type’s efficiency. For typical parameters, it will be the case that tL ∈ {1, . . . , tL − 1}, so that the
low type engages in some experimentation but not as much as socially efficient; however, it is possible
that the low type is induced to not experiment at all (tL = 0) or to experiment for the first-best amount of
time (tL = tL). The former possibility arises for reasons akin to exclusion in the standard model (e.g. the
prior, µ0, on the high type is sufficiently high); the latter possibility is because time is discrete. Indeed, if
the length of each time interval shrinks and one takes a suitable continuous-time limit, then there will be
some distortion, i.e. tL < tL.
The proof of Theorem 2 does not rely on characterizing second-best contracts.25 We establish tH = tH
23 Mason and Va¨lima¨ki (2011), Bhaskar (2012, 2014), Ho¨rner and Samuelson (2013), and Kwon (2013) also high-
light dynamic agency effects, but in settings without adverse selection.
24 Related issues arise in static models that allow for both adverse selection and moral hazard; see for example
the discussion in Laffont and Martimort (2001, Chapter 7).
25 Note that when δ < 1, efficiency requires each type to use a “stopping strategy” (i.e., work for a consecutive
sequence of periods beginning with period one). The proof technique for Theorem 2 does not allow us to establish
that the low type uses a stopping strategy in the second-best solution; however, it shows that one can take the high
type to be doing so. That the low type can also be taken to use a stopping strategy (with the second-best stopping
time) will be deduced subsequently in those cases in which we are able to characterize second-best contracts.
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by proving that the low type’s self-selection constraint can always be satisfied without creating any distor-
tions. The idea is that the principal can exploit the two types’ differing probabilities of success by making
the high type’s contract “risky enough” to deter the low type from taking it, while still satisfying all other
constraints.26 We establish tL ≤ tL by showing that any contract for the low type inducing tL > tL can
be modified by “removing” the last period of experimentation in this contract and concurrently reducing
the information rent for the high type. Due to the lack of structure governing the high type’s behav-
ior upon deviating to the low type’s contract, we prove the information-rent reduction no matter what
action plan the high type would choose upon taking the low type’s contract. It follows that inducing
over-experimentation by the low type cannot be optimal: not only would that reduce social surplus but it
would also increase the high type’s information rent.
While Theorem 2 has implications for the extent of experimentation and innovation in different eco-
nomic environments, we postpone such discussion to Subsection 5.3, after describing optimal contracts
and their comparative statics.
5. Optimal Contracts when tH > tL
We characterize optimal contracts by first studying the case in which the first-best stopping times are
ordered tH > tL, i.e. when the speed-of-learning effect that pushes the first-best stopping time down for
a higher-ability agent does not dominate the productivity effect that pushes in the other direction. Any of
the following conditions on the primitives is sufficient for tH > tL, given a set of other parameters: (i) β0
is small enough, (ii) λL and λH are small enough, or (iii) c is large enough. We maintain the assumption
that tH > tL implicitly throughout this section.
5.1. The solution
A class of solutions to the principal’s program described in Section 4 when tH > tL is as follows:
26 Specifically, given an optimal contract for the high type, the principal can increase the magnitude of the penal-
ties while adjusting the time-zero transfer so that the high type’s expected payoff and effort profile do not change.
Making the penalties severe enough (i.e., negative enough) then ensures that the low type’s payoff from taking the
high type’s contract is negative and hence (ICLH ) is satisfied at no cost. Crucially, an analogous construction would
not work for the high type’s self-selection constraint: the high type’s payoff under the low type’s contract cannot be
lower than the low type’s, as the high type can always generate the same distribution of project success as the low
type by suitably mixing over effort. From the point of view of correlated-information mechanism design (Cremer
and McLean, 1985, 1988; Riordan and Sappington, 1988), the issue is that because of moral hazard, the signal cor-
related with the agent’s type is not independent of the agent’s report. In a different setting, Obara (2008) has also
noted this effect of hidden actions. While Obara (2008) shows that in his setting approximate full surplus extraction
may be achieved by having agents randomize over their actions, this is not generally possible here because the
feasible set of distributions of project success for the high type is a superset of that of the low type.
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Theorem 3. Assume tH > tL. There is an optimal menu in which the principal separates the two types using
penalty contracts. In particular, the optimum can be implemented using a onetime-penalty contract for type H ,










1. For all t ∈ {1, . . . , tL},
lLt =












if t = tL;
(6)
2. WL0 > 0 is such that the participation constraint, (IR
L), binds;
3. Type H gets an information rent: UH0 (C
H ,αH(CH)) > 0;
4. 1 ∈ αH(CH); 1 ∈ αL(CL); and 1 = αH(CL).
Generically, the above contract is the unique optimal contract for type L within the class of penalty contracts.
Proof. See Appendix B. Q.E.D.
The optimal contract for the low type characterized by (6) is a penalty contract in which the magnitude
of the penalty is increasing over time, with a “jump” in the contract’s final period. The jump highlights
dynamic agency effects: by obtaining a success in a period t, the agent not only avoids the penalty lLt
but also the penalty lLt+1 and those after. The last period’s penalty needs to compensate for the absence
of future penalties. Figure 2 depicts the low type’s contract; the comparative statics seen in the figure
will be discussed subsequently. Only when there is no discounting does the low type’s contract reduce
to a onetime-penalty contract where a penalty is paid only if the project has not succeeded by tL. For
any discount factor, the high type’s contract characterized in Theorem 3 is a onetime-penalty contract in
which he only pays a penalty to the principal if there is no success by the first-best stopping time tH . On
the equilibrium path, both types of the agent exert effort in every period until their respective stopping
times; moreover, were the high type to take the low type’s contract (off the equilibrium path), he would
also exert effort in every period of the contract. This implies that the high type gets an information rent
because he would be less likely than the low type to incur any of the penalties in CL.
Although the optimal contract for the low type is (generically) unique among penalty contracts, there
are a variety of optimal penalty contracts for the high type. The reason is that the low type’s optimal
contract is pinned down by the need to simultaneously incentivize the low type’s effort and yet minimize
the information rent obtained by the high type. This leads to a sequence of penalties for the low type,
given by (6), that make him indifferent between working and shirking in each period of the contract, as
we explain further in Subsection 5.2. On the other hand, the high type’s contract only needs to be made
unattractive to the low type subject to incentivizing effort from the high type and providing the high type
a utility level given by his information rent. There is latitude in how this can be done: the onetime penalty
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in the high type’s contract of Theorem 3 is chosen to be severe enough so that this contract is “too risky”
for the low type to accept.
Remark 1. The proof of Theorem 3 provides a simple algorithm to solve for an optimal menu of contracts.
For any tˆ ∈ {0, . . . , tL}, we characterize an optimal menu that solves the principal’s program subject to
an additional constraint that the low type must experiment until period tˆ. The low type’s contract in this
menu is given by (6) with the termination date tˆ rather than tL. An optimal (unconstrained) menu is then
obtained by maximizing the principal’s objective function over tˆ ∈ {0, . . . , tL}.
The characterization in Theorem 3 yields the following comparative statics:
Proposition 2. Assume tH > tL and consider changes in parameters that preserve this ordering. The second-best
stopping time for type L, tL, is weakly increasing in β0 and λL, weakly decreasing in c and µ0, and can increase
or decrease in λH . The distortion in this stopping time, measured by tL − tL, is weakly increasing in µ0 and can
increase or decrease in β0, λL, λH , and c.
Proof. See the Supplementary Appendix. Q.E.D.
Figure 2 illustrates some of the conclusions of Proposition 2. The comparative static of tL in µ0 is
intuitive: the higher the ex-ante probability of the high type, the more the principal benefits from reducing
the high type’s information rent and hence the more she shortens the low type’s experimentation. Matters
are more subtle for other parameters. Consider, for example, an increase in β0. On the one hand, this
increases the social surplus from experimentation, which suggests that tL should increase. But there are
two other effects: holding fixed tL, penalties of lower magnitude can be used to incentivize effort from the
low type because the project is more likely to succeed (cf. equation (6)), which has an effect of decreasing
the information rent for the high type; yet, a higher β0 also has a direct effect of increasing the information
rent because the differing probability of success for the two types is only relevant when the project is good.
Nevertheless, Proposition 2 establishes that it is optimal to (weakly) increase tL when β0 increases.
Since the high type’s information rent is increasing in λH , one may expect the principal to reduce the
low type’s experimentation when λH increases. However, a higher λH means that the high type is likely
to succeed earlier when deviating to the low type’s contract. For this reason, an increase in λH can reduce
the incremental information-rent cost of extending the low type’s contract, to the extent that the gain in
efficiency from the low type makes it optimal to increase tL.
Turning to the magnitude of distortion, tL − tL: since the first-best stopping time tL does not depend
on the probability of a high type, µ0, while t
L is decreasing in this parameter, it is immediate that the
distortion is increasing in µ0. The time tL is also independent of the high type’s ability, λH ; thus, since
t
L may increase or decrease in λH , the same is true for tL − tL. Finally, with respect to β0, λL, and c, the
distortion’s ambiguous comparative statics stem from the fact that tL and tL move in the same direction
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Figure 2 – The optimal penalty contract for type L under different values of µ0 and β0. Both graphs
have δ = 0.5, λL = 0.1, λH = 0.12, and c = 0.06. The left graph has β0 = 0.89, µ0 = 0.3, and µ′0 = 0.6;
the right graph has β0 = 0.85, β′0 = 0.89, and µ0 = 0.3. The first-best entails tL = 15 on the left graph,
and tL = 12 (for β0) and tL = 15 (for β′0) on the right graph.
tL − tL when µ0 is high; the reason is that a larger ex-ante probability of the high type makes increasing
t
L more costly in terms of information rent.
Theorem 3 utilizes penalty contracts in which the agent is required to pay the principal when he fails
to obtain a success. While these contracts prove analytically convenient (as explained in Subsection 5.2),
a weakness is that they do not satisfy interim participation constraints: in the implementation of Theorem 3,
the agent of either type θ would “walk away” from his contract in any period t ∈ {1, . . . , tθ} if he could.
The following result provides a remedy:
Theorem 4. Assume tH > tL. The second best can also be implemented using a menu of bonus contracts. Specifi-
cally, the principal offers type L the bonus contract CL = (tL,WL0 , b






where lL is the penalty sequence in the optimal penalty contract given in Theorem 3, and WL0 is chosen to make the
participation constraint, (IRL), bind. For typeH , the principal can use a constant-bonus contractCH = (tH ,WH0 , b
H)
with a suitably chosen WH0 and b
H > 0.
Generically, the above contract is the unique optimal contract for typeLwithin the class of bonus contracts. This
implementation satisfies interim participation constraints in each period for each type, i.e. each type θ’s continuation
utility at the beginning of any period t ∈ {1, . . . , tθ} in Cθ is non-negative.
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A proof is omitted because the proof of Proposition 1 can be used to verify that each bonus contract
in Theorem 4 is equivalent to the corresponding penalty contract in Theorem 3, and hence the optimality
of those penalty contracts implies the optimality of these bonus contracts. Using (6), it is readily verified















+ δbLt+1 for any t ∈ {1, . . . , tL − 1}, (8)
and hence the reward for success increases over time. When δ = 1, the low type’s bonus contract is a
constant-bonus contract, analogous to the penalty contract in Theorem 3 being a onetime-penalty contract.
An interpretation of the bonus contracts in Theorem 4 is that the principal initially sells the project to
the agent at some price (the up-front transfer W0) with a commitment to buy back the output generated
by a success at time-dated future prices (the bonuses b).
5.2. Sketch of the proof
We now sketch in some detail how we prove Theorem 3. The arguments reveal how the interaction
of adverse selection, dynamic moral hazard, and private learning jointly shape optimal contracts. This
subsection also serves as a guide to follow the formal proof in Appendix B.
While we have defined a contract as C = (T,W0, b, l), it will be useful in this subsection alone (so
as to parallel the formal proof) to consider a larger space of contracts, where a contract is given by
C = (Γ,W0, b, l). The first element here is a set of periods, Γ ⊆ N \ {0}, at which the agent is not “locked
out,” i.e. at which he is allowed to choose whether to work or shirk. As discussed in fn. 14, this additional
instrument does not yield the principal any benefit, but it will be notationally convenient in the proof.
The termination date of the contract is now 0 if Γ = ∅ and otherwise max Γ. We say that a contract is
connected if Γ = {1, . . . , T} for some T ; in this case we refer to T as the length of the contract, and T is also
the termination date. The agent’s actions are denoted by a = (at)t∈Γ.
As justified by Proposition 1, we solve the principal’s problem (stated at the outset of Section 4) by
restricting attention to menus of penalty contracts: for each θ ∈ {L,H}, Cθ = (Γθ,W θ0 , lθ). Penalty
contracts are analytically convenient to deal with the combination of adverse selection and dynamic moral
hazard for reasons explained in Step 4 below.
Step 1: We simplify the principal’s program by (i) focussing on contracts for type L that induce him
to work in every non-lockout period, i.e. on contracts in the set {CL : 1 ∈ αL(CL)}; and (ii) ignoring the
constraints (IRH ) and (ICLH ). It is established in the proof of Theorem 2 that a solution to this simplified
program also solves the original program.27 Call this program [P1].
27 The idea for (i) is as follows: fix any contract, CL, in which there is some period, t ∈ ΓL, such that it would be
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It is not obvious a priori what action plan the high type may use when taking the low type’s con-
tract. Accordingly, we tackle a relaxed program, [RP1], that replaces (ICHL) in program [P1] by a relaxed
version, called (Weak-ICHL), that only requires type H to prefer taking his contract and following an
optimal action plan over taking type L’s contract and working in every period. Formally, (ICHL) re-
quires UH0 (C
H ,αH(CH)) ≥ UH0 (CL,αH(CL)) whereas (Weak-ICHL) requires only UH0 (CH ,αH(CH)) ≥
UH0 (C
L,1). We emphasize that this restriction on typeH’s action plan under type L’s contract is not with-
out loss for an arbitrary contract CL; i.e., given an arbitrary CL with 1 ∈ αL(CL), it need not be the case
that 1 ∈ αH(CL)—it is in this sense that there is no “single-crossing property” in general. The reason is
that because of their differing probabilities of success from working in future periods (conditional on the
good state), the two types trade off current and future penalties differently when considering exerting ef-
fort in the current period. In particular, the desire to avoid future penalties provides more of an incentive
for the low type to work in the current period than the high type.28
Relaxing (ICHL) to (Weak-ICHL) is motivated by a conjecture that even though the high type may
choose to work less than the low type in an arbitrary contract, this will not be the case in an optimal
contract for the low type. This relaxation is a critical step in making the program tractable because it
severs the knot in the fixed point problem of optimizing over the low type’s contract while not knowing
what action plan the high type would follow should he take this contract. The relaxation works because
of the efficiency ordering tH > tL, as elaborated subsequently.
In the relaxed program [RP1], it is straightforward to show that (Weak-ICHL) and (IRL) must bind at
an optimum: otherwise, time-zero transfers in one of the two contracts can be profitably lowered with-
out violating any of the constraints. Consequently, one can substitute from the binding version of these
constraints to rewrite the objective function as the sum of total surplus less an information rent for the
high type, as in the standard approach. We are left with a relaxed program, [RP2], which maximizes this
objective function and whose only constraints are the direct moral hazard constraints (ICHa ) and (ICLa ),
where type L must work in all periods. This program is tractable because it can be solved by separately
suboptimal for type L to work in period t. Since type L will not succeed in period t, one can modify CL to create a
new contract, ĈL, in which t /∈ Γ̂L, and lLt is “shifted up” by one period with an adjustment for discounting. This
ensures that the incentives for type L in all other periods remain unchanged, and critically, that no matter what
behavior would have been optimal for type H under contract CL, the new contract is less attractive to type H .
As for (ii), we show that type H always has an optimal action plan under contract CL that yields him a higher
payoff than that of type L under CL, and hence (IRH ) is implied by (ICHL) and (IRL). Finally, we show that (ICLH )
can always be satisfied while still satisfying the other constraints in the principal’s program by making the high
type’s contract “risky enough” to deter the low type from taking it.
28 To substantiate this point, consider any two-period penalty contract under which it is optimal for both types
to work in each period. It can be verified that changing the first-period penalty by ε1 > 0 while simultaneously
changing the second period penalty by−ε2 < 0 would preserve type θ’s incentive to work in period one if and only
if ε1 ≤ (1− λθ)δε2. Note that because −ε2 < 0, both types will continue to work in period two independent of their
action in period one. Consequently, the initial contract can always be modified in a way that preserves optimality
of working in both periods for the low type, but makes it optimal for the high type to shirk in period one and work
in period two.
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optimizing over each type’s penalty contract. The following steps 2–5 derive an optimal contract for type
L in program [RP2] that has useful properties.
Step 2: We show that there is an optimal penalty contract for type L that is connected. A rough in-
tuition is as follows.29 Because type L is required to work in all non-lockout periods, the value of the
objective function in program [RP2] can be improved by removing any lockout periods in one of two
ways: either by “shifting up” the sequence of effort and penalties or by terminating the contract early
(suitably adjusting for discounting in either case). Shifting up the sequence of effort and penalties elimi-
nates inefficient delays in type L’s experimentation, but it also increases the rent given to type H , because
the penalties—which are more likely to be borne by type L than type H—are now paid earlier. Con-
versely, terminating the contract early reduces the rent given to type H by lowering the total penalties in
the contract, but it also shortens experimentation by type L. It turns out that either of these modifications
may be beneficial to the principal, but at least one of them will be if the initial contract is not connected.
Step 3: Given any termination date TL, there are many penalty sequences that can be used by a
connected penalty contract of length TL to induce the low-ability agent to work in each period 1, . . . , TL.
We construct the unique sequence, call it l(TL), that ensures the low type’s incentive constraint for effort
binds in each period of the contract, i.e. in any period t ∈ {1, . . . , TL}, the low type is indifferent between
working (and then choosing any optimal effort profile in subsequent periods) and shirking (and then
choosing any optimal effort profile in subsequent periods), given the past history of effort. The intuition




L) = −c+ (1− βLTLλL)lLTL(TL). Iteratively working backward using a one-step deviation principle,
this pins down penalties in each earlier period through the (forward-looking) incentive constraint for
effort in each period. Naturally, for any TL and t ∈ {1, . . . , TL}, lLt (TL) < 0, i.e. as suggested by the term
“penalty”, the agent pays the principal each time there is a failure.
Step 4: We show that any connected penalty contract for type L that solves program [RP2] must use
the penalty structure lL(·) of Step 3. The idea is that any slack in the low type’s incentive constraint for
effort in any period can be used to modify the contract to strictly reduce the high type’s expected payoff
from taking the low type’s contract (without affecting the low type’s behavior or expected payoff), based
on the high type succeeding with higher probability in every period when taking the low type’s contract.30
Although this logic is intuitive, a formal argument must deal with the challenge that modifying a
transfer in any period to reduce slack in the low type’s incentive constraint for effort in that period has
feedback on incentives in every prior period—the dynamic agency problem. Our focus on penalty con-
tracts facilitates the analysis here because penalty contracts have the property that reducing the incentive
29 For the intuition that follows, assume that all penalties being discussed are negative transfers, i.e. transfers from
the agent to the principal.
30 This is because the constraint (Weak-ICHL) in program [RP2] effectively constrains the high type in this way,
even though, as previously noted, it may not be optimal for the high type to work in each period when taking an
arbitrary contract for the low type.
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to exert effort in any period t by decreasing the severity of the penalty in period t has a positive feedback
of also reducing the incentive for effort in earlier periods, since the continuation value of reaching period
t increases. Due to this positive feedback, we are able to show that the low type’s incentive for effort in
a given period of a connected penalty contract can be modified without affecting his incentives in any
other period by solely adjusting the penalties in that period and the previous one. In particular, in an
arbitrary connected penalty contract CL, if type L’s incentive constraint is slack in some period t, we can
increase lLt and reduce lLt−1 in a way that leaves type L’s incentives for effort unchanged in every period
s 6= t while still being satisfied in period t. We then verify that this “local modification” strictly reduces
the high type’s information rent.31
Step 5: In light of Steps 2–4, all optimal connected penalty contracts for type L in program [RP2] can
be found by just optimizing over the length of connected penalty contracts with the penalty structure
l
L
(·). By Theorem 2, the optimal length, tL, cannot be larger than the first-best stopping time: tL ≤ tL.
In this step, we further establish that tL is generically unique, and that generically there is no optimal
penalty contract for type L that is not connected.
Step 6: Let CL be the contract for type L identified in Steps 2–5.32 Recall that [RP1] differs from
the principal’s original program [P1] in that it imposes (Weak-ICHL) rather than (ICHL). In this step, we
show that any solution to [RP1] using CL satisfies (ICHL) and hence is also a solution to program [P1].
Specifically, we show that αH(CL) = 1, i.e. if type H were to take contract CL, it would be uniquely
optimal for him to work in all periods 1, . . . , tL. The intuition is as follows: under contract CL, type
H has a higher expected probability of success from working in any period t ≤ tL, no matter his prior
choices of effort, than does type L in period t given that type L has exerted effort in all prior periods
(recall 1 ∈ αL(CL)). The argument relies on Theorem 2 having established that tL ≤ tL, because tH > tL
then implies that for any t ∈ {1, . . . , tL}, βHt λH > βLt λL for any history of effort by type H in periods
1, . . . , t − 1. Using this property, we verify that because CL makes type L indifferent between working
and shirking in each period up to tL (given that he has worked in all prior periods), type H would find it
strictly optimal to work in each period up to tL no matter his prior history of effort.
5.3. Implications and applications
Asymmetric information and success. Our results offer predictions on the extent of experimentation
and innovation. An immediate implication concerns the effects of asymmetric information. Compare
31 By contrast, bonuses have a negative feedback: reducing the bonus in a period t increases the incentive to work in
prior periods because the continuation value of reaching period t decreases. Consequently, keeping incentives for
effort in earlier periods unchanged after reducing the bonus in period t would require a “global modification” of
reducing the bonus in all prior periods, not just the previous period. This makes the analysis with bonus contracts
less convenient.
32 The initial transfer in C
L
is set to make the participation constraint for type L bind. In the non-generic cases
where there are multiple optimal lengths of contract, C
L
uses the largest one.
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a setting with either no moral hazard or no adverse selection, as in Theorem 1, with a setting where
both features are present, as in Theorem 2. The theorems reveal that, other things equal, the amount of
experimentation will be lower in the latter, and, consequently, the average probability of success will also
be lower. Furthermore, because low-ability agents’ experimentation is typically distorted down whereas
that of high-ability agents is not, we predict a larger dispersion in success rates across agents and projects
when both forms of asymmetric information are present.33
Our analysis also bears on the relationship between innovation rates and the quality of the underly-
ing environment. Absent any distortions, “better environments” lead to more success. In particular, an
increase in the agent’s average ability, µ0λH + (1−µ0)λL, yields a higher probability of success in the first
best.34 However, contracts designed in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection need not pro-
duce this property. The reason is that an improvement in the agent’s average ability can make it optimal
for the principal to distort experimentation by more: as shown in Proposition 2, tL decreases in µ0 and,
for some parameter values, in λH . Such a reduction in tL can decrease the second-best average success
probability when the agent’s average ability increases. Consequently, observing higher innovation rates
in contractual settings is neither necessary nor sufficient to deduce a better underlying environment.
Contract farming and technology adoption. Though our model is not developed to explain a particular
application, our framework speaks to contract farming and, more broadly, technology adoption in de-
veloping countries. Technology adoption is inherently a dynamic process of experimentation and learn-
ing. Understanding the adoption of agricultural innovations in low-income countries, and the obstacles
to it, has been a central topic in development economics (Feder, Just, and Zilberman, 1985; Foster and
Rosenzweig, 2010). Practitioners, policymakers, and researchers have long recognized the importance of
contractual arrangements to provide proper incentives, because farmers typically don’t internalize the
broader benefits of their experimentation.
As described in the Introduction, contract farming is a common practice in developing countries; it
involves a profit-maximizing firm, which is typically a large-scale buyer such as an exporter or a food
processor, and a farmer, who may be a small or a large grower. The contractual environment features not
only learning about the quality of new seeds or a new technology, but also moral hazard and unobservable
heterogeneity (Miyata et al., 2009).35 The arrangements used between agricultural firms and farmers
resemble the contracts characterized in Theorem 4, with firms committing to time-dated future prices for
an output of a certain quality delivered by a given deadline. Our analysis shows why such contracts are
optimal in the presence of uncertainty, moral hazard, and unobservable heterogeneity, and how the shape
33 While this is readily evident when tH > tL, it is also true when tH ≤ tL. In the latter case, even though the
second best may narrow the gap in the types’ duration of experimentation, the gap in their success rates widens.
34 Although tL and tH may increase or decrease in λL and λH respectively, one can show that the first-best prob-
ability of success is always increasing in µ0, λL, and λH .
35 Using a field experiment, Kelsey (2013) shows that landholders have private information relevant to their per-
formance under a contract that offers incentives for afforestation, and that efficiency can be increased by using an
allocation mechanism that induces self-selection.
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of the contract hinges on the interaction of these three key features. Theorem 4 and formula (8) reveal
how an optimal pattern of outcome-contingent buyback prices should be determined. In principle, these
predicted contracts could be subject to empirical testing.
Much of the recent research on technology adoption uses controlled field experiments to study the
incentives of potential adopters. Our results may inform the design of experimental work, particularly
with regards to dynamic considerations, which are receiving increasing attention. For example, Jack et al.
(2014) use a field experiment to study both the initial take-up decision and the subsequent investment
(follow-through) decisions in the context of agricultural technology (tree species) adoption in Zambia.
The authors consider simple contracts to investigate the interplay between the uncertainty of a technol-
ogy’s profitability, the self-selection of farmers, and learning of new information. In their experimental
design, contracts specify the initial price of the technology and an outcome-contingent payment tied to
the survival of trees by the end of one year. The study uses variation of the contracts in the two dimen-
sions (initial price and contingent payment) to evaluate their performance. The authors find that 35% of
farmers who pay a positive price for take-up have no trees one year later; in addition, among farmers
who follow-through, the tree survival rate responds to learning over time.
The contract form used in Jack et al. (2014) shares features with what emerges as an optimal contract
in our model, and their basic findings are also consistent with our results. Their controlled experiment
is simple in that performance is assessed and a reward is paid only at the end of one year. Our model
shows that to optimally incentivize experimentation, agents must be compensated with continual rewards
contingent on the time of success, up until an optimally chosen termination date which may differ from
the efficient stopping time. Moreover, perhaps counterintuitively, Theorem 4 shows that higher rewards
must be offered for later success, with the rate of increase depending on the rate of learning (and other
factors).36 Our results thus point to a new dimension that can improve follow-through rates; this could
be tested in future field experiments.
Finally, many scholars study the puzzle of low technology adoption rates and its potential solutions
(e.g., Suri, 2011, and the references therein). Our paper adds to the discussion by relating adoption rates
to the underlying contractual environment. As mentioned earlier, we predict less experimentation, lower
success rates, and more dispersion of success rates in settings with more asymmetric information; the
lower (and more dispersed) success rates translate into lower (and more dispersed) adoption rates. We
also find that the relationship between adoption rates and the underlying environment can be subtle, with
“better environments” possibly leading to less experimentation and lower adoption in the second best.
Our results thus provide a novel explanation for the low adoption rate puzzle. Empirical researchers
have recently been interested in how agency contributes to the puzzle (e.g., Atkin et al., 2015); our work
contributes to the theoretical background for such lines of inquiry.
36 In particular, formula (8) reveals that rewards will optimally increase more sharply over time, up until the
contract termination, if the rate of learning is higher.
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Naturally, there are dimensions of contract farming and technology adoption that our analysis does
not cover. For example, social learning among farmers affects adoption (Conley and Udry, 2010), and
agricultural companies will want to take this into account when designing contracts.37 A deeper under-
standing of optimal contracts for multiple experimenting agents who can learn from each other would
be useful for this application.38 While this and similar extensions may yield new insights, we expect our
main results to be robust: to reduce the information rent of high-ability types, the principal will benefit
from distorting the length of experimentation of low-ability types, and from setting payments so that
their incentive constraint for effort binds at each time. This suggests that, under appropriate conditions,
an agent will still receive a higher reward for succeeding later rather than earlier.
Book contracts. As mentioned in the Introduction, some contractual relationships between a publisher
and author have the features we study: it is initially uncertain whether a satisfactory book can be written
in the relevant timeframe; the author may be privately informed about his suitability for the task; and
how much time the author spends on this is not observable to the publisher. It is common for real-world
publishing contracts to resemble the penalty contracts characterized in Theorem 3: book contracts pay
an advance to the author that the publisher can recoup if the author fails to deliver on time (according
to a delivery-of-manuscript clause) or if the book is unacceptable (according to a satisfactory-manuscript
clause); see Bunnin (1983) and Fowler (1985). There is substantial dispersion in both the deadlines and
the advances that authors are given; Kuzyk (2006) notes that publishing houses try to assess an author’s
chances of succeeding when determining these terms.
6. Optimal Contracts when tH ≤ tL
We now turn to characterizing optimal contracts when the first-best stopping times are ordered tH ≤ tL.
Any of the following conditions on the primitives is sufficient for this case given a set of other parameters:
(i) β0 is large enough, (ii) λH is large enough, or (iii) c is small enough.
The principal’s program remains as described in Section 4, but solving the program is now substan-
tially more difficult than when tH > tL. To understand why, consider Figure 3, which depicts the two
types’ “no-shirk expected marginal product” curves, βθtλθ, as a function of time. (For simplicity, the fig-
ure is drawn ignoring integer constraints.) For any parameters, these curves cross exactly once as shown




H − βLt∗λL ≥ 0 > βHt∗+1λH − βLt∗+1λL.
37 Another aspect is the choice of farmer size: as discussed in Miyata et al. (2009), there are different advantages
to contracting with small versus large growers, and the optimal farmer size for a firm may change as parties exper-
iment and learn over time.
38 Recent work on this agenda, albeit without adverse selection, includes Frick and Ishii (2015) and Moroni (2015).
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Parameters under which tH > tL entail tL < t∗, as seen with the high effort cost in Figure 3. When
tL ≤ t∗, it holds at any t ≤ tL that the high type has a higher expected marginal product than the low type
conditional on the agent working in all prior periods. It is this fact that allowed us to prove Theorem 3 by
conjecturing that the high type would work in every period when taking the low type’s contract.
By contrast, tH ≤ tL implies tL ≥ t∗, as seen with the low effort cost in Figure 3. Since the second-best
stopping time for the low type can be arbitrarily close to his first-best stopping time (e.g. if the prior on
the low type, 1 − µ0, is sufficiently large), it is no longer valid to conjecture that the high type will work
in every period when taking the low type’s optimal contract—in this sense, “single crossing” need not
hold even at the optimum. The reason is that at some period after t∗, given that both types have worked
in each prior period, the high type can be sufficiently more pessimistic than the low type that the high
type finds it optimal to shirk in some or all of the remaining periods, even though λH > λL and the low
type would be willing to work for the contract’s duration.39 Indeed, this will necessarily be true in the
last period of the low type’s contract if this period is later than t∗ and the contract makes the low type just
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Figure 3 – No-shirk expected marginal product curves with β0 = 0.99, λL = 0.28, λH = 0.35.
Solving the principal’s program without being able to restrict attention to some suitable subset of
action plans for the high type when he takes the lo type’s contract appears intractable. For an arbitrary
δ, we have been unable to find a valid restriction. The following example elucidates the difficulties.
Example 1. For an open and dense set of parameters {β0, c, λL, λH} with tL = tL = 3,40 there is a δ∗ ∈ (0, 1)
39 More precisely, the relaxed program, [RP1], described in Step 1 of the proof sketch of Theorem 3 can yield a
solution that is not feasible in the original program, because the constraint (ICHL) is violated; the high type would
deviate from accepting his contract to accepting the low type’s contract and then shirk in some periods.
40 It suffices for the parameters to satisfy the following four conditions:
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such that the optimal penalty contract for type L as a function of the discount factor, CL(δ) = (3,WL0 (δ), l
L(δ)),
has the property that the optimal action plans for type H under this contract are given by
αH(CL(δ)) =

{(1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1)} if δ ∈ (0, δ∗)
{(1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1)} if δ = δ∗
{(1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1)} if δ ∈ (δ∗, 1)
{(1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1), (0, 1, 1)} if δ = 1.
Figure 4 depicts the contract and type H’s optimal action plans as a function of δ for a particular set of other
parameters.41 Notice that the only action plan that is optimal for type H for all δ is the non-consecutive-work plan
(1, 0, 1), but for each value of δ at least one other plan is also optimal. Interestingly, the stopping strategy (1, 1, 0) is
not optimal for typeH when δ ∈ (δ∗, 1) although it is when δ = 1. The lack of lower hemi-continuity ofαH(CL(δ))
at δ = 1 is not an accident, as we will discuss subsequently.
Nevertheless, we are able to solve the problem when δ = 1.
Theorem 5. Assume δ = 1 and tH ≤ tL. There is an optimal menu in which the principal separates the two types




























, where tHL := max
a∈αH(CL)
# {n : an = 1};
2. WL0 > 0 is such that the participation constraint, (IR
L), binds;
3. Type H gets an information rent: UH0 (C
H ,αH(CH)) > 0;
4. 1 ∈ αH(CH); 1 ∈ αL(CL).
Proof. See Appendix C. Q.E.D.
1. The first-best stopping time for type L is tL = 3 (i.e., β
L
3 λ
L > c > β
L
4 λ
L) and the probability of type L is large
enough (i.e., µ0 is sufficiently small) that it is not optimal to distort the stopping time of type L: t
L
= tL = 3.
2. The expected marginal product for typeH after one period of work is less than that of type L after one period










3. Ex-ante, typeH is more likely to succeed by working in one period than type L is by working in two periods:
1− λH < (1− λL)2.


















41 The initial transfer WL0 in each case is determined by making the participation constraint of type L bind.
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Optimal Contracts: Sketch of Proof


























































Figure 4 – The optimal penalty contract for type L in Example 1 with β0 = 0.86, c = 0.1, λL = 0.75,
λH = 0.95 (left graph) and the optimal action profiles for type H under this contract (right graph).
For δ = 1, the optimal menus of penalty contracts characterized in Theorem 5 for tH ≤ tL share some
common properties with those characterized in Theorem 3 for tH > tL: in both cases, a onetime-penalty
contract is used for the low type and the high type earns an information rent. On the other hand, part
1 of Theorem 5 points to two differences: (i) it will generally be the case in the optimal CL that when
tH ≤ tL, 1 /∈ αH(CL), whereas for tH > tL, αH(CL) = 1; and (ii) when tH ≤ tL, it can be optimal for the
principal to induce the low type to work in each period by satisfying the low type’s incentive constraint
for effort with slack (i.e. with strict inequality), whereas when tH > tL, the penalty sequence makes this
effort constraint bind in each period.
The intuition for these differences derives from information rent minimization considerations. The
high type earns an information rent because by following the same effort profile as the low type he is less
likely to incur any penalty for failure, and hence has a higher utility from any penalty contract than the
low type.42 Minimizing the rent through this channel suggests minimizing the magnitude of the penalties
that are used to incentivize the low type’s effort; it is this logic that drives Theorem 3 and for δ = 1 leads
to a onetime-penalty contract with
lL
t






However, when tL > t∗ (which is only possible when tH ≤ tL), the high type would find it optimal under
this contract to work only for some T < tL number of periods. It is then possible—and is true for an open
and dense set of parameters—that T is such that the high type is more likely to incur the onetime penalty
42 Strictly speaking, this intuition applies so long as lt ≤ 0 for all t in the penalty contract.
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than the low type. But in such a case, the penalty given in (9) would not be optimal because the principal
can lower lL
t
L (i.e. increase the magnitude of the penalty) to reduce the information rent, which she can
keep doing until the high type finds it optimal to work for more periods and becomes less likely to incur
the onetime penalty than the low type. This explains part 1 of Theorem 5.
We should note that this possibility arises because time is discrete. It can be shown that when the




LλL ≤ βHtHLλH (in particular, βLtLλL = β
H
tHLλ
H when tL > tHL, or equivalently when tL > t∗), and
hence lL
t





is optimal, just as in Theorem 3 when δ = 1. Intuitively, because learning is smooth in
continuous time, the high type would always work long enough upon deviating to the low type’s contract
that he is less likely to incur the onetime penalty lL
t
L than the low type. Thus, by the logic above, lowering
the onetime penalty below that in (9) would only increase the information rent of the high type in the
continuous-time limit.
Remark 2. The proof of Theorem 5 provides an algorithm to solve for an optimal menu of contracts when
tH ≤ tL and δ = 1. For each pair of integers (s, t) such that 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ tL, one can compute the principal’s
payoff from using the onetime-penalty contract for type L given by Theorem 5 when tL is replaced by t
and tHL is replaced by s. Optimizing over (s, t) then yields an optimal (unconstrained) menu.
How do we prove Theorem 5 in light of the difficulties described earlier of finding a suitable restriction
on the high type’s behavior when taking the low-type’s contract? The answer is that when δ = 1, one can
conjecture that the optimal contract for the low type must be a onetime-penalty contract (as was also true
when tH > tL). Notice that because of no discounting, any onetime-penalty contract would make the
agent of either type indifferent among all action plans that involve the same number of periods of work.
In particular, a stopping strategy—an action plan that involves consecutive work for some number of
periods followed by shirking thereafter—is always optimal for either type in a onetime-penalty contract.
The heart of the proof of Theorem 5 establishes that it is without loss of generality to restrict attention
to penalty contracts for the low type under which the high type would find it optimal to use a stopping
strategy (see Subsection C.4 in Appendix C). With this in hand, we are then able to show that a onetime-
penalty contract for the low type is indeed optimal (see Subsection C.5). Finally, the rent-minimization
considerations described above are used to complete the argument. Observe that optimality of a onetime-
penalty contract for the low type and that of a stopping strategy for the high type under such a contract
is consistent with the solution in Example 1 for δ = 1, as seen in Figure 4. Moreover, the example plainly
shows that such a strategy space restriction will not generally be valid when δ < 1.43
We provide a bonus-contracts implementation of Theorem 5:
43 Due to the agent’s indifference over all action plans that involve the same number of periods of work in a
onetime-penalty contract when δ = 1, the correspondence αH(CL(δ)) will generally fail lower hemi-continuity at
δ = 1. In particular, the low type’s optimal contract for δ close to 1 may be such that a stopping strategy is not
optimal for the high type under this contract. However, the correspondence αH(CL(δ)) is upper hemi-continuous
and the optimal contract is continuous at δ = 1. All these points can be seen in Figure 4.
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Theorem 6. Assume δ = 1 and tH ≤ tL. The second-best can also be implemented using a menu of constant-
bonus contracts: CL = (tL,WL0 , b
L) with bL = −lL
t





L is given in Theorem 5, and
CH = (tH ,WH0 , b
H) with a suitably chosen WH0 and b
H > 0.
A proof is omitted since this result follows directly from Theorem 5 and the proof of Proposition 1
(using δ = 1). For similar reasons to those discussed around Theorem 4, the implementation in Theorem 6
satisfies interim participation constraints whereas that of Theorem 5 does not.
We end this section by emphasizing that although we are unable to characterize second-best optimal
contracts when δ < 1 and tH ≤ tL, the (in)efficiency conclusions from Theorem 2 apply for all parameters.
7. Discussion
7.1. Private observability and disclosure
Suppose that project success is privately observed by the agent but can be verifiably disclosed. The prin-
cipal’s payoff from project success obtains here only when the agent discloses it, and contracts are condi-
tioned not on project success but rather the disclosure of project success. Private observability introduces
additional constraints for the principal because the agent must also now be incentivized to not withhold
project success. For example, in a bonus contract where δbt+1 > bt, an agent who obtains success in period
t would strictly prefer to withhold it and continue to period t + 1, shirk in that period, and then reveal
the success at the end of period t + 1. Nevertheless, we show in the Supplementary Appendix that pri-
vate observability does not reduce the principal’s payoff compared to our baseline setting: in each of the
menus identified in Theorems 3–6, each of the contracts would induce the agent (of either type) to reveal
project success immediately when it is obtained, so these menus remain optimal and implement the same
outcome as when project success is publicly observable.44
7.2. Limited liability
To focus on the interaction of adverse selection and moral hazard in experimentation, we have abstracted
away from limited-liability considerations. Consider introducing the requirement that all transfers must
be above some minimum threshold, say zero. The Supplementary Appendix shows how such a limited-
liability constraint alters the second-best solution for the case of tH > tL and δ = 1. This constraint
results in both types of the agent acquiring a rent, so long as they are both induced to experiment. Three
44 However, unlike the menus of Theorems 3–6, not every optimal menu under public observability is optimal
under private observability. In this sense, these menus have a desirable robustness property that other optimal
menus need not.
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points are worth emphasizing. First, each type’s second-best stopping time is no larger than his first-
best stopping time. The logic precluding over-experimentation, however, is somewhat different—and
simpler—than without limited liability: inducing over-experimentation requires paying a bonus of more
than one (the principal’s value of success) in the last period of the contract in which the agent works, im-
plying a loss for the principal which under limited liability cannot be offset through an up-front payment.
Second, while both types’ second-best stopping times are now (typically) distorted, their ordering is the
same as without limited liability (i.e., tL ≤ tH ). The reason is that the principal could otherwise improve
upon the menu by just offering both types the low type’s contract, which would induce the high type
to experiment longer without increasing the high type’s payoff. Third, the principal can implement the
second-best stopping time for the low type by using a constant-bonus contract of the form described in
Theorem 4 (with δ = 1). This contract ensures that the low type’s incentive constraint for effort binds in
each period, and thus it minimizes both the rent that the low type obtains from his contract and the high
type’s payoff from taking the low type’s contract.
We should note that in our dynamic setting, there are less severe forms of limited liability that may be
relevant in applications. For example, one may only require that the sum of penalties at any point do not
exceed the initial transfer given to the agent.45 We conjecture that similar conclusions to those discussed
above would also emerge under such a requirement, as both types of the agent will again acquire a rent.
7.3. The role of learning
We have assumed that β0 ∈ (0, 1). If instead β0 = 1 then there would be no learning about the project
quality and the first best would entail both types working until project success has been obtained. How
is the second best affected by β0 = 1?
Suppose, for simplicity, that there is some (possibly large) exogenous date T at which the game ends.
The first-best stopping times are then tL = tH = T . The principal’s program can be solved here just as
in Section 5, because βHt λH = λH > β
L
t λ
L = λL for all t ≤ T .46 In the absence of learning, the social
surplus from the low type working is constant over time. So long as parameters are such that it is not





= T . We provide a more complete argument in the Supplementary Appendix, but to see the
intuition consider a large T . Then, even though both types are likely to succeed prior to T , the probability





as t→∞. Hence, it would not be optimal to locally distort the length of experimentation from T because
such a distortion would generate a larger efficiency loss from the low type than a gain from reducing
45 Biais et al. (2010) study such a limited-liability requirement in a setting without adverse selection or learning,
where large losses arrive according to a Poisson process whose intensity is determined by the agent’s effort.
46 It should be clear that nothing would have changed in the analysis in Section 5 if we had assumed existence of
a suitably large end date, in particular so long as T ≥ max{tH , tL}.
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the high type’s information rent. By contrast, when β0 < 1 and there is learning, this logic fails because
the incremental social surplus from the low type working vanishes over time. Therefore, learning from
experimentation plays an important role in our results: for any parameters with β0 < 1 under which there
is distortion of the low type’s length of experimentation without entirely excluding him, there would
instead be no distortion were β0 = 1.
7.4. Adverse selection on other dimensions
Another important modeling assumption in this paper is that pre-contractual hidden information is about
the agent’s ability. An alternative is to suppose that the agent has hidden information about his cost of
effort but his ability is commonly known; specifically, the low type’s cost of working in any period is
cL > 0 whereas the high type’s cost is cH ∈ (0, cL). It is immediate that the first-best stopping time for the
high type would always be larger than that of the low type because there is no speed-of-learning effect.
Hence, the problem can be solved following our approach in Section 5 for tH > tL.47 However, not only
would this alternative model miss the considerations involved with tH ≤ tL, but furthermore, it also
obviates interesting features of the problem even when tH > tL. For example, in this setting it would be
optimal for the high type to work in all periods in any contract in which it is optimal for the low type to
work in all periods; recall that this is not true in our model even when tH > tL (cf. fn. 28).
Another source of adverse selection would be private information about project quality. Specifically,
suppose that the agent’s ability is commonly known but, prior to contracting, he receives a private signal
about the true project quality: there is a high type whose belief that the state is good is βH0 ∈ (0, 1) and
a low type whose belief is βL0 ∈ (0, βH0 ).48 Again, the first-best stopping times here would always have
tH > tL and the problem can be studied following our approach to this case.
47 This applies to binary effort choices. Another alternative would be for the agent to choose effort from a richer
set, e.g. R+, and effort costs be convex with one type having a lower marginal cost than the other. The speed-of-
learning effect would emerge in this setting because the two types would generally choose different effort levels in
any period. Analyzing such a problem is beyond the scope of this paper.
48 Private information about project quality is studied by Gomes et al. (2015) in experimentation without moral
hazard, and in a different setting by Gerardi and Maestri (2012). Another possibility would be non-common priors
between the principal and the agent, which would involve quite distinct considerations.
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Appendices: Notation and Terminology
It is convenient in proving our results to work with an apparently larger set of contracts than that defined
in the main text. Specifically, in the Appendices, we assume that the principal can stipulate binding
“lockout” periods in which the agent is prohibited from working. As discussed in fn. 14 of the main
text, this instrument does not yield any benefit to the principal because suitable transfers can be used to
ensure that the agent shirks in any desired period regardless of his type and action history. Nevertheless,
stipulating lockout periods simplifies the phrasing of our arguments; we use it, in particular, to prove that
an optimal contract for the low type never induces him to shirk before termination.
Accordingly, we denote a general contract by C = (Γ,W0, b, l), where all the elements are as intro-
duced in the main text, except that instead of having the termination date of the contract in the first
component, we now have a set of periods, Γ ⊆ N \ {0}, at which the agent is not locked out, i.e. at which
he is allowed to choose whether to work or shirk. Note that, without loss, b = (bt)t∈Γ and l = (lt)t∈Γ,49
and the agent’s actions are denoted by a = (at)t∈Γ, where at = 1 if the agent works in period t ∈ Γ and
at = 0 if the agent shirks. The termination date of the contract is 0 if Γ = ∅ and is otherwise max Γ, which
we require to be finite.50 We say that a contract is connected if Γ = {1, . . . , T} for some T ; in this case we
refer to T as the length of the contract, T is also the termination date, and we write C = (T,W0, b, l).
Given some program for the principal, we say that a simplified program entails no loss of optimality if
the value of the two programs is the same.
A. Proof of Theorem 2
Without loss by Proposition 1, we focus on penalty contracts throughout the proof.
A.1. Step 1: Low type always works






which the low type works in all periods t ∈ ΓL. Denote the set of penalty contracts by C, and recall that













subject to, for all θ, θ′ ∈ {L,H},
aθ ∈ αθ(Cθ), (ICθa)
U θ0 (C
θ,aθ) ≥ 0, (IRθ)
U θ0 (C







49 There is no loss in not allowing for transfers in lockout periods.
50 One can show that this restriction does not hurt the principal.
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Suppose there is a solution to this program, (CH ,CL,aH ,aL), with aL 6= 1 and CL = (ΓL,WL0 , lL). It
suffices to show that there is another solution to the program, (CH , ĈL,aH ,1), where ĈL =
(




(i) 1 ∈ αL(ĈL);
(ii) UL0 (C
L,aL) = UL0 (Ĉ
L,1);
(iii) ΠL0 (C
L,aL) = ΠL0 (Ĉ
L,1); and
(iv) UH0 (C
L,αH(CL)) ≥ UH0 (ĈL,αH(ĈL)).
To this end, let t = min{s : as = 0} and denote the largest preceding period in ΓL as
p(t) =
{








Γ̂L = ΓL\ {t} ;
l̂Ls =
{
lLs if s 6= p(t) and s ∈ Γ̂L,
lLs + δ
t−p(t)lLt if s = p(t) > 0;
ŴL0 =
{
WL0 if p(t) > 0,
WL0 + δ
tlLt if p(t) = 0.
Notice that under contractCL, the profile aL has type L shirking in period t and thus receiving lLt with
probability one conditional on not succeeding before this period; the new contract ĈL just locks the agent
out in period t and shifts the payment lLt up to the preceding non-lockout period, suitably discounted. It
follows that the incentives for effort for type L remain unchanged in any other period; moreover, since
aLt = 0, both the principal’s payoff from type L under this contract and type L’s payoff do not change.
Finally, observe that for type H , no matter which action he would take at t in any optimal action plan
under CL (whether it is work or shirk), his payoff from ĈL must be weakly lower because the lockout in
period t is effectively as though he has been forced to shirk in period t and receive lLt .
Performing this procedure repeatedly for each period in which the original profile aL prescribes shirk-
ing yields a final contract ĈL which satisfies all the desired properties.
A.2. Step 2: Simplifying the principal’s problem
















1 ∈ αL(CL) (ICLa )
















) ≥ UH0 (CL,αH (CL)) . (ICHL)
We first show that it is without loss of optimality to ignore constraints (IRH ) and (ICLH ).
Step 2a: Consider (IRH ). Define a stochastic action plan σ = (σt)t∈ΓL for type H under contract C
L
as follows: σt ∈ ∆ ({0, 1}) with σt (1) ≡ λLλH and σt (0) ≡ 1 − λ
L
λH
for all t ∈ ΓL. In other words, under
σ, the agent works in any period of ΓL (so long as he not succeeded before) with probability λL/λH .
Note that these probabilities are independent across periods. By construction, it holds for all t ∈ ΓL that
Eσ [at] = λL, where Eσ is the ex-ante expectation with respect to the probability measure induced by σ.














































































where the second equality follows from the independence of σt and σs for all t, s ∈ ΓL, the third equality
follows from the fact that Eσ [at] = λL for all t ∈ ΓL, and the inequality follows from λL < 1.51
It follows immediately from the above string of (in)equalities that there exists a pure action plan




1− λL) means (1 − λL)|ΓL|, and analogously for similar ex-
pressions.
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) ≥ UH0 (CL,σ) ≥ UL0 (CL,1) ≥ 0,




) ≥ UH0 (CL, αH (CL)) ≥ UH0 (CL,a) ≥ 0,
which establishes (IRH ).
Step 2b: Consider next (ICLH ). By the same arguments as in Step 1, without loss of optimality we can
restrict attention to contracts for the high type CH in which the high type works in all periods t ∈ ΓH .
If an optimal contract CH has ΓH = ∅, (ICLH ) is trivially satisfied.52 Thus, assume an optimal contract
CH has ΓH 6= ∅. Let TH = max ΓH and denote type H’s expected payoff under CH by UH0 . We show
that there exists a onetime-penalty contract that yields the principal the same expected payoff as CH and





and ŴH0 jointly ensure
that type H works in all periods t ∈ ΓH and his expected payoff under ĈH is equal to UH0 : ∏
t∈ΓH
(
1− λH)β0 + (1− β0)







1− λH)− (1− β0) ∑
t∈ΓH
δt
+ ŴH0 = UH0 .
(A.1)
It is immediate that any such contract ĈH yields the principal the same expected payoff from type H as
the original contract CH , as it leaves both type H’s action plan and type H’s expected payoff under the
new contract unchanged from the original contract. Furthermore, note that the penalty l̂H
TH
can be chosen
to be severe enough (i.e. sufficiently negative) to ensure that it is also optimal for type L to work in all
periods after accepting contract ĈH ; i.e., we can choose l̂H
TH
so that for all θ ∈ {L,H}, αθ(ĈH) = 1. All
that remains is to show that a sufficiently severe l̂H
TH
and its corresponding ŴH0 (determined by (A.1))
also satisfy (ICLH ) given that αL(ĈH) = 1. To show this, note that type L’s expected payoff from taking












































Since ΓH 6= ∅ and ∏
t∈ΓH
(
1− λL) − ∏
t∈ΓH
(
1− λH) > 0, l̂H
TH





< 0, establishing (ICLH ).
Step 2c: By Step 2a and Step 2b, it is without loss of optimality to ignore (IRH ) and (ICLH ) in program
52 If an optimal contractCH excludes typeH , then without loss it can be taken to involve no transfers at all, which
ensures that it would yield type L a zero payoff, and hence (ICLH ) follows from (IRL).
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1 ∈ αL(CL) (ICLa )








) ≥ UH0 (CL,αH (CL)) . (ICHL)
It is clear that in any solution to program [P1], (IRL) must be binding: otherwise, the initial time-zero
transfer from the principal to the agent in the contract CL can be reduced slightly to strictly improve the
second term of the objective function while not violating any of the constraints. Similarly, (ICHL) must
also bind because otherwise the time-zero transfer in the contract CH can be reduced to improve the first
term of the objective function without violating any of the constraints.
Using these two binding constraints, substituting in the formulae from equations (1) and (2), and
letting the principal select the optimal action plan the high type should use when taking the low type’s
contract (aHL ∈ αH(CL)), we can rewrite the objective function (P1) as the expected total surplus less











































































1 ∈ arg max
(at)t∈ΓL













 , (ICLa )
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aH ∈ arg max
(at)t∈ΓH















Program [P2] is separable, i.e. it can be solved by maximizing (P2) with respect to (CL,aHL) subject to
(ICLa ) and separately maximizing (P2) with respect to (CH ,aH) subject to (ICHa ).




. Note that given any action plan a that

















whenever both a, â ∈ αH (CL) .
It will be convenient at various places to consider the difference in information rents under contracts










)− UH0 (CL,a))− (UL0 (ĈL,1)− UL0 (CL,1)) . (A.3)


















A.3. Step 3: Under-experimentation by the low type
Suppose per contra that CL = (ΓL,WL0 , l
L) is an optimal contract for the low type inducing him to work
for
∣∣ΓL∣∣ > tL periods. This implies ΓL 6= ∅. We show that there exists ĈL = (Γ̂L, ŴL0 , l̂L) that induces the
low type to work for |Γ̂L| = ∣∣ΓL∣∣− 1 periods and strictly increases the principal’s payoff.
Let T = max ΓL and T̂ = max ΓL\ {T} be respectively the last and the second to the last non-lockout
periods in contract CL. Consider contract ĈL defined as follows:
Γ̂L = ΓL\ {T} ,
l̂Lt =
{
lLt if t ∈ Γ̂L and t < T̂
lL
T̂
+ δT−T̂ (1− λL)lLT − δT−T̂ c if t = T̂ ,
and Ŵ0 is such that (IRL) binds in contract ĈL. Note that by construction, ĈL gives the agent a continu-
ation payoff in T̂ which is the same the low-type agent would obtain if, given no success in T̂ , the agent
were to work in period T . We proceed in two sub-steps.
Step 3a: Type L works in all periods of ĈL
36
We first show that type L works in all periods t ∈ Γ̂L in ĈL. Specifically, we show that type L’s
“incentive to work” in any period t ∈ Γ̂L under ĈL is the same as his incentive to work in that period t
under the original contract CL; hence, the fact that type L is willing to work in all periods t ∈ ΓL under
CL given that he works in all future periods (by Step 1) implies that is willing to work in all periods t ∈ Γ̂L
under ĈL given that he works in all future periods.
Type L’s incentive to work in period T̂ under the original contract CL, given that he works in period
T under such contract, is given by the difference between his continuation payoff from working and his


































|ΓL|−1 if the agent works in all periods prior to T̂ . Type L works in period T̂ only if










More generally, type L’s incentive to work in any period t ∈ ΓL, t < T , under contract CL, given work in





















Note that βLt = β
L
|{s≤t:s∈ΓL}| if the low type works in all periods prior to t. Under contract ĈL, type






































































which is equal to expression (A.6) above. Hence, type L is willing to work in all periods t ∈ Γ̂L under
contract ĈL.
Step 3b: Contract ĈL weakly reduces type H’s information rent
37
Since
∣∣ΓL∣∣ > tL and contract ĈL induces type L to work for ∣∣ΓL∣∣− 1 periods, it is immediate that ĈL
strictly increases surplus from type L relative to CL. To show that ĈL increases the principal’s objective,
it is thus sufficient to show that ĈL weakly reduces type H’s information rent relative to CL.
Let âHL ∈ αH(ĈL) be an optimal action plan for type H under contract ĈL, âHL = (âHLt )t∈Γ̂L . Define
an action plan âHL(1) for type H under contract CL as follows: âHL(1)t = â
HL
t for t ∈ Γ̂L and âHL(1)T = 1.




) ≥ R(CL, âHL(1)). (A.7)













































































































(λH − λL)lLT . (A.8)
Note that since type L is willing to work in period T under contract CL (by Step 1), it holds that




)−R(CL, âHL(1)) < 0.
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A.4. Step 4: Efficient experimentation by the high type
The objective in [P2] involving the high type’s contract is social surplus from the high type. Furthermore,
when aH = (1, . . . , 1), with the sequence having arbitrary finite length, there is obviously a sequence
of (sufficiently severe) penalties lH to ensure that (ICHa ) is satisfied. It follows that we can take aH =
(1, . . . , 1) in an optimal contract CH , where the number of periods of work is tH .
B. Proof of Theorem 3
We remind the reader that Subsection 5.2 provides an outline and intuition for this proof. Without loss by
Proposition 1, we focus on penalty contracts throughout the proof. In this appendix, we will introduce
programs and constraints that have analogies with those used in Appendix A. Accordingly, we often
use the same labels for equations as before, but the reader should bear in mind that all references in this
appendix to such equations are to those defined in this appendix.
B.1. Step 1: The principal’s program
By Step 1 and Step 2 in the proof of Theorem 2, we work with the principal’s program [P1]. Recall that
in this program, without loss, type L works in all periods t ∈ ΓL and constraints (ICLH ) and (IRH ) of
program [P] are ignored. In this step, we relax the principal’s program by considering a weak version
of (ICHL) in which type H is assumed to exert effort in all periods t ∈ ΓL if he chooses CL. The relaxed















1 ∈ αL(CL) (ICLa )








) ≥ UH0 (CL,1) . (Weak-ICHL)
By the same arguments as in Step 2 in the proof of Theorem 2, it is clear that in any solution to program
[RP1], (IRL) and (Weak-ICHL) must be binding. Using these two binding constraints and substituting
in the formulae from equations (1) and (2), we can rewrite the objective function (RP1) as the sum of
expected total surplus less type H’s “information rent”, obtaining the following explicit version of the
39































































1 ∈ arg max
(at)t∈ΓL













 , (ICLa )
aH ∈ arg max
(at)t∈ΓH













 . (ICHa )
Program [RP2] is separable, i.e. it can be solved by maximizing (RP2) with respect to CL subject to
(ICLa ) and separately maximizing (RP2) with respect to (CH ,aH) subject to (ICHa ).
B.2. Step 2: Connected contracts for the low type
We claim that in program [RP2], it is without loss to consider solutions in which the low type’s contract















































subject to (ICLa ),


























To avoid trivialities, consider any optimal CL with ΓL 6= ∅. First consider the possibility that 1 /∈ ΓL.
In this case, construct a new penalty contract ĈL that is “shifted up by one period”:
Γ̂L = {s : s+ 1 ∈ ΓL},
l̂Ls = l
L




Clearly it remains optimal for the agent to work in every period in Γ̂L, and since the value of (B.1) must
have been weakly positive under CL, it is now weakly higher since the modification has just multiplied
it by δ−1 > 1. This procedure can be repeated for all lockout periods at the beginning of the contract, so
that without loss, we hereafter assume that 1 ∈ ΓL. We are of course done if ΓL is now connected, so also
assume that ΓL is not connected.
Let t◦ be the earliest lockout period in CL, i.e. t◦ = min{t : t /∈ ΓL and t − 1 ∈ ΓL}. (Such a t◦ > 1
exists given the preceding discussion.) We will argue that one of two possible modifications preserves
the agent’s incentive to work in all periods in the modified contract and weakly improves the princi-
pal’s payoff. This suffices because the procedure can then be applied iteratively to produce a connected
contract.
Modification 1: Consider first a modified penalty contract ĈL that removes the lockout period t◦ and
shortens the contract by one period as follows:
Γ̂L = {1, . . . , t◦ − 1} ∪ {s : s ≥ t◦ and s+ 1 ∈ ΓL},
l̂Ls =

lLs if s < t◦ − 1,
lLs + ∆1 if s = t◦ − 1,




Note that in the above construction, ∆1 is a free parameter. We will find conditions on ∆1 such that type
L’s incentives for effort are unchanged and the principal is weakly better off.
For an arbitrary t, define
S(t) =
(













The value of (B.1) under CL is















The value of (B.1) after the modification to ĈL is






























δtlLt R(t) + δ











Therefore, the modification benefits the principal if and only if
















δ−1 − 1) ∑
t∈ΓL
t>t◦
δtlLt R(t) + δ
t◦−1∆1R(t◦ − 1)−
(






The above inequality is satisfied for any ∆1 if δ = 1, and if δ < 1, then after rearranging terms, the above
























Now turn to the incentives for effort for the agent of type L. Clearly, since CL induces the agent to
work in all periods, it remains optimal for the agent to work under ĈL in all periods beginning with t◦.
Consider the incentive constraint for effort in period t◦ − 1 under ĈL. Using (B.2), this is given by:
− βLt◦−1λL











 [(1− λL) lLt − c]
 ≥ c. (B.5)
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 [(1− λL) lLt − c]
 ≥ c. (B.6)
If we choose ∆1 such that the left-hand side of (B.5) is equal to the left-hand side of (B.6), then since it
is optimal to work under the original contract in period t◦ − 1, it will also be optimal to work under the






























 [(1− λL) lLt − c] , (B.7)
where the second equality is because {t : t ∈ ΓL, t > t◦ − 1} = {t : t ∈ ΓL, t > t◦}, since t◦ /∈ ΓL. Note that
(B.7) implies ∆1 = 0 if δ = 1.
Now consider the incentive constraint for effort in any period τ < t◦ − 1. We will show that because
∆1 is such that the left-hand side of (B.5) is equal to the left-hand side of (B.6), the fact that it was optimal
to work in period τ under contract CL implies that it is optimal to work in period τ under contract ĈL.









 [(1− λL) lLt − c]
 ≥ c, (B.8)
which is satisfied sinceCL induces the agent to work in all periods. Analogously, the incentive constraint









 [(1− λL) l̂Lt − c]
 ≥ c.
Algebraic simplification using the definition of ĈL and equation (B.7) shows that this constraint is identi-
cal to (B.8), and hence is satisfied.
Thus, if δ = 1, this modification with ∆1 = 0 weakly benefits the principal while preserving the
agent’s incentives, and we are done. So hereafter assume δ < 1, which requires us to also consider
another modification.






L = {1, . . . , t◦ − 1}, l˜Ls =
{
lLs if s < t◦ − 1,
lLs + ∆2 if s = t◦ − 1.
Again, ∆2 is a free parameter above. We now find conditions on ∆2 such that type L’s incentives are
unchanged and the principal is weakly better off.
The value of (B.1) under the modification C˜L is











δtlLt R(t) + δ





Therefore, recalling (B.3), this modification benefits the principal if and only if













δtlLt R(t) + δ




























As with the previous modification, the only incentive constraint for effort that needs to be verified in




) ≥ c. (B.10)










 [(1− λL) lLt − c] = ∆11− δ−1 , (B.11)
where the second equality follows from (B.7). But now, observe that (B.11) implies that either (B.4) or (B.9)
is guaranteed to hold, and hence either the modification to ĈL or to C˜L weakly benefits the principal while
preserving the agent’s effort incentives.
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Remark 3. Given δ < 1, the choice of ∆2 in (B.11) implies that if inequality (B.4) holds with equality then
so does inequality (B.9), and vice-versa. In other words, if neither of the modifications strictly benefits the
principal (while preserving the agent’s effort incentives), then it must be that both modifications leave the
principal’s payoff unchanged (while preserving the agent’s effort incentives).
B.3. Step 3: Defining the critical contract for the low type
Take any connected penalty contract CL = (TL,WL0 , l
L) that induces effort from the low type in each
period t ∈ {1, . . . , TL}. We claim that the low type’s incentive constraint for effort binds at all periods if
















if t = TL. (B.12)
The proof of this claim is via three sub-steps; for the remainder of this step, since TL is given and held
fixed, we ease notation by just writing lL instead of lL(TL).
Step 3a: First, we argue that with the above penalty sequence, the low type is indifferent between
working and shirking in each period t ∈ {1, . . . , TL} given that he has worked in all prior periods and
will do in all subsequent periods no matter his action at period t. In other words, we need to show that







1− λL)s−(t+1) [(1− λL) lLs − c]
 = c.53 (B.13)
We prove that (B.13) is indeed satisfied for all t by induction. First, it is immediate from (B.12) that





































1− λL)s−t [(1− λL) lLs − c]
 ,






















1− λL)s−(t+1) [(1− λL) lLs − c]
 .
Setting these payoffs from working and shirking equal to each other and manipulating terms yields (B.13).
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To show that (B.13) holds for t, it suffices to show that
−βLt λL





1− λL)s−(t+2) [(1− λL) lLs − c]
 = c.












































, which is true by the definition
of lL in (B.12).
Step 3b: Next, we show that given the sequence lL, it would be optimal for the low type to work in
any period no matter the prior history of effort. Consider first the last period, TL. No matter the history
of prior effort, the current belief is some βL
TL
≥ βLTL , hence −βLTLλLl
L
t ≥ βLTLλLlLt = c (where the equality
is by definition), so that it is optimal to work in TL .
Now assume inductively that the assertion is true for period t + 1 ≤ TL, and consider period t < TL
after any history of prior effort, with current belief βLt . Since we already showed that equation (B.13)







1− λL)s−(t+1) [(1− λL) lLs − c]
 ≥ c,
and hence it is optimal for the agent to work in period t.
Step 3c: Finally, we argue that any profile of penalties, lL, that makes the low type’s incentive con-
straint for effort bind at every period t ∈ {1, . . . , TL}must coincide with lL, given that the penalty contract
must induce work from the low type in each period up to TL. Again, we use induction. Since lLTL is the
unique penalty that makes the agent indifferent between working and shirking at period TL given that he




TL . Note from Step 3b that it would remain optimal
for the agent to work in period TL given any profile of effort in prior periods.
For the inductive step, pick some period t < TL and assume that in every period x ∈ {t, . . . , TL},
the agent is indifferent between working and shirking given that he has worked in all prior periods, and
would also find it optimal to work at x following any other profile of effort prior to x. Under these







1− λL)s−(t+2) [(1− λL) lLs − c]
 = c. (B.16)
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1− λL)s−(t+1) [(1− λL) lLs − c]
 ≥ c,
which, when set to bind, can be written as
− βLt λL





1− λL)s−(t+2) [(1− λL) lLs − c]
 = c.
(B.17)









, and performing some algebra
shows that lLt = l
L
t . Moreover, by the reasoning in Step 3b, this also ensures that the agent would find it
optimal to work in period t for any other history of actions prior to period t.
B.4. Step 4: The critical contract is optimal
By Step 2, we can restrict attention in solving program [RP2] to connected penalty contracts for the low
type. For any TL, Step 3 identified a particular sequence of penalties, lL(TL). We now show that any
connected penalty contract for the low type that solves [RP2] must have precisely this penalty structure.
The proof involves two sub-steps; throughout, we hold an arbitrary TL fixed and, to ease notation,
drop the dependence of lL(·) on TL.
Step 4a: We first show that any connected penalty contract for the low type of length TL that satisfies
(ICLa ) and has lLt > l
L




t : t ≤ TL and lLt > lLt
}
.
Observe that we must have tˆ < TL because otherwise (ICLa ) would be violated in period TL. Fur-
thermore, by definition of tˆ, lLt ≤ lLt for all TL ≥ t > tˆ. We will prove that we can change the penalty
structure by lowering lL
tˆ
and raising some subsequent lLs for s ∈ {tˆ+ 1, . . . , TL} in a way that keeps type
L’s incentives for effort unchanged, and yet increase the value of the objective function (RP2).
Claim: There exists t˜ ∈ {tˆ+ 1, . . . , TL} such that (ICLa ) at t˜ is slack and lLt˜ < l
L
t˜ .
Proof : Suppose not, then for each TL ≥ t > tˆ, either lLt = lLt , or lLt < lLt and (ICLa ) binds. Then since
whenever lLt < l
L
t , (ICLa ) binds by supposition, it must be that in all t > tˆ, (ICLa ) binds (this follows from
Step 3). But then (ICLa ) at tˆ is violated since lLtˆ > l
L
tˆ . ‖




t and for any t ∈
{
tˆ+ 1, ..., t
}
, (ICLa ) at t is slack.
In particular, we can take t to be the first such period after tˆ.
Proof : Fix t˜ in the previous claim. Note that (ICLa ) at tˆ + 1 must be slack because otherwise (ICLa ) at




tˆ and Step 3. There are two cases. (1) lLtˆ+1 < l
L






tˆ+1; in this case, since (ICLa ) is slack at tˆ + 1, it must be that (ICLa ) at tˆ + 2 is slack (otherwise, the














, and we are sure that (ICLa ) is slack in all periods of this process before reaching t˜. ‖




tˆ and slightly increase lLt < l
L
t and meanwhile
keep the incentives for effort of type L satisfied for all periods. By the same reasoning as used in Step 2,
the incentive constraint for effort in period tˆ (given that the agent will work in all subsequent periods no








1− λL)t−(tˆ+1) [(1− λL) lLt − c]
 ≥ c. (B.18)
Observe that if we reduce lL
tˆ







left-hand side of (B.18) does not change. Moreover, it follows that incentives for effort at t < tˆ are also
unchanged (see Step 2), and the incentive condition at t will be satisfied if ∆ is small enough because the
original (ICLa ) at t is slack.
Finally, we show that the modification above leads to a reduction of the rent of type H in (RP2),











1− λH)t−1 − (1− λL)t−1]
 . (B.19)
Hence, the change in the rent from reducing lL
tˆ










1− λH)tˆ − (1− λL)tˆ]+ 1
(1− λL)t−tˆ
[(







1− λH)t−tˆ − (1− λL)t−tˆ] < 0,
where the inequality is because t > tˆ and 1− λH < 1− λL.
Step 4b: By Step 4a, we can restrict attention to penalty sequences lL such that lLt ≤ lLt for all t ≤ TL.
Now we show that unless lL(·) = lL(·), the value of the objective (RP2) can be improved while satisfying
the incentive constraint for effort, (ICLa ). Recall that by Step 4a, (ICLa ) is satisfied in all periods t = 1, . . . , TL
whenever lLt = l
L
t . Thus, if lLt < l
L
t for any period, we can replace lLt by l
L
t without affecting the effort
incentives for type L. Moreover, by doing this we reduce the rent of type H , given by (B.19) above, and
thus raise the value of (RP2).
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B.5. Step 5: Generic uniqueness of the optimal contract for the low type
By Step 4, an optimal contract for the low type that solves program [RP2] can be found by optimizing
over TL, i.e. the length of connected penalty contracts with the penalty structure lL(TL). By Theorem 2,
TL ≤ tL. In this step, we establish generic uniqueness of the optimal contract for the low type. We proceed
in two sub-steps.
Step 5a: First, we show that the optimal length TL of connected penalty contracts with the penalty



























1− λH)t−1 − (1− λL)t−1]
 ,(B.20)
where we have used the desired penalty sequence. Note that by Theorem 2 TL ≤ tL in any optimal




. It follows that if we
perturb µ0 locally, the set of maximizers will not change. Now suppose that the maximizer of V (TL) is not
unique. Without loss, pick any two maximizers T˜L and T̂L. We must have V (T˜L) = V (T̂L) and (again
by Theorem 2) tL ≥ max{T˜L, T̂L}. Without loss, assume T̂L > T˜L. Note that the first term in square
brackets in (B.20) is social surplus from the low type and hence it is strictly increasing in TL for TL < tL.
Therefore, both the first and second terms in V (T̂L) must be larger than the first and second terms in
V (T˜L) respectively. But then it is immediate that perturbing µ0 within an arbitrarily small neighborhood
will change the ranking of V (T˜L) and V (T̂L), which implies that the assumed multiplicity is non-generic.
It follows that there is generically a unique TL that maximizes V (TL); hereafter we denote this solu-
tion tL. In the non-generic cases in which multiple maximizers exist, we select the largest one.
Step 5b: In Step 5a we showed that among connected penalty contracts, there is generically a unique
contract for type L that solves [RP2]. We now claim that there generically cannot be any other penalty
contract for type L that solves [RP2]. Suppose, to contradiction, that this is false: there is an optimal
non-connected penalty contract CL = (ΓL,WL0 , l
L) in which 1 ∈ αL(CL). Let t◦ < max ΓL be the earliest
lockout period in CL. Without loss, owing to genericity, we take δ < 1. Following the arguments of Step
2, in particular Remark 3, the optimality of CL implies that there are two connected penalty contracts that
are also optimal: ĈL = (T̂L, ŴL0 , l̂
L) obtained from CL by applying Modification 1 of Step 2 as many
times as needed to eliminate all lockout periods, and C˜L = (T˜L, W˜L0 , l˜
L) obtained from CL by applying
Modification 2 of Step 2 to shorten the contract by just eliminating all periods from t◦ on. Note that the
modifications ensure that 1 ∈ αL(ĈL) and 1 ∈ αL(C˜L). But now, the fact that T̂L > T˜L contradicts the
generic uniqueness of connected penalty contracts for the low type that solve [RP2].
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B.6. Step 6: Back to the original program
We have shown so far that there is a solution to program [RP2] in which the low type’s contract is a
connected penalty contract of length tL ≤ tL and in which the penalty sequence is given by lL(tL). In
terms of optimizing over the high type’s contract, note that, as shown in Theorem 2, we can take the
solution as inducing the high type to work in each period up to tH and no longer: this follows from the
fact that the portion of the objective in (RP2) involving the high type’s contract is social surplus from the
high type.
Recall that solutions to [RP2] produce solutions to [RP1] by choosing WL0 to make (IR
L) bind and WH0





connected penalty contract where WL0 is set to make (IRL) bind. Recall that [RP1] differs from program
[P1] in that it imposes (Weak-ICHL) rather than (ICHL). We will argue that any solution to [RP1] using
C
L satisfies (ICHL) and hence is also a solution to program [P1]. As shown in Step 2 of the proof of
Theorem 2, contract CL can then be combined with a suitable onetime-penalty contract for type H to
produce a solution to the principal’s original program [P].
We show that given any connected penalty contract of length TL ≤ tL with penalty sequence lL(TL),
it would be optimal for type H to work in every period 1, . . . , TL, no matter the history of prior effort. Fix
any TL ≤ tL and write lL ≡ lL(TL). The argument is by induction. Consider the last period, TL. Since
−βLTLλLlLTL = c, it follows from the fact that tH > tL (hence βHt λH > βLt λL for all t < tH ) that no matter




TL ≥ c, i.e., regardless of the history, type H will work in period TL. Now
assume that it is optimal for type H to work in period t + 1 ≤ TL no matter the history of effort, and














1− λH)s−(t+2) [(1− λH) lLs − c] ≤ − cβHt+1λH − lLt+1. (B.21)
Therefore, at period t < TL:
−βHt λH




























1− λH) βHt c
βHt+1
= −βHt λH lLt + δc ≥ −βLt λLlLt + δc = c,
where the first inequality uses (B.21), the second equality uses βHt+1 =
βHt (1−λH)
1−βHt +βHt (1−λH)
, and the final equal-
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C. Proof of Theorem 5
We assume throughout this appendix that δ = 1. Without loss of optimality by Proposition 1, we focus
on menus of penalty contracts. In this appendix, we will introduce programs and constraints that have
analogies with those used in Appendix B for the case of tH > tL. Accordingly, we often use the same
labels for equations as before, but the reader should bear in mind that all references in this appendix to
such equations are to those defined in this appendix.
Outline. Since this is a long proof, let us outline the components. We begin in Step 1 by taking program
[P2] from the proof of Theorem 2 for the case of δ = 1; we continue to call this program [P2]. Note that a
critical difference here relative to the relaxed program [RP2] in the proof of Theorem 3 is that the current
program [P2] does not constrain what the high type must do when taking the low type’s contract.
In Step 2, we show that there is an optimal penalty contract for type L that is connected. In Step 3, we
develop three lemmas pertaining to properties of the set αH(CL) in any CL that is an optimal contract
for type L. We then use these lemmas in Step 4 to show that in solving [P2], we can restrict attention
to connected penalty contracts CL for type L such that αH(CL) includes a stopping strategy with the most
work property, i.e., an action plan that involves consecutive work for some number of periods followed by
shirking thereafter, and where the number of work periods is larger than in any action plan in αH(CL).
Building on the restriction to stopping strategies, we then show in Step 5 that there is always an optimal
contract for type L that is a onetime-penalty contract.
The last step, Step 6, is relegated to the Supplementary Appendix. For an arbitrary time TL, this step
first defines a particular last-period penalty lL
TL
(TL) and an associated time THL(TL) ≤ TL, and then
establishes that if TL is the optimal length of experimentation for type L, there is an optimal onetime-
penalty contract for type L with penalty lL
TL
(TL) and in which type H’s most-work optimal stopping
strategy involves THL(TL) periods of work. Hence, using lL
TL
(TL) and THL(TL), an optimal contract for
type L that solves [P2] can be found by optimizing over the length TL. By Theorem 2, the optimal length,
t
L, is no larger than the first-best stopping time, tL.
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C.1. Step 1: The principal’s program
By Step 1 and Step 2 in the proof of Theorem 2, we work with the principal’s program [P2]. Here we



























































































 , (ICLa )














 . (ICHa )
As in the second step in the proof of Theorem 2, the information rent of type H when he takes action












whenever a,a′ ∈ αH (CL) . The difference in information rents under contracts ĈL and CL




)−R (CL,a) = (UH0 (ĈL, â)− UH0 (CL,a))− (UL0 (ĈL,1)− UL0 (CL,1)) . (C.1)


















C.2. Step 2: Connected contracts for the low type
We now claim that in program [P2], it is without loss to consider solutions in which the low type’s contract
is a connected penalty contract, i.e. solutions CL in which ΓL =
{
1, . . . , TL
}
for some TL.
To avoid trivialities, consider any optimal non-connectedCL with ΓL 6= ∅. Let t◦ be the earliest lockout
period in CL, i.e. t◦ = min{t : t > 0, t /∈ ΓL}. Consider a modified penalty contract ĈL that removes the




L = {1, . . . , t◦ − 1} ∪ {s : s ≥ t◦ and s+ 1 ∈ ΓL}, l̂Ls =
{
lLs if s ≤ t◦ − 1,
lLs+1 if s ≥ t◦ and s ∈ Γ̂L.
Given δ = 1, it is straightforward that it remains optimal for type L to work in every period in Γ̂L,
and given any optimal action plan for type H under the original contract, aHL ∈ αH(CL), the action plan
âHL = (âHLs )s∈Γ̂L =
{
aHLs if s ≤ t◦ − 1,
aHLs+1 if s ≥ t◦ and s ∈ Γ̂L,
is optimal for type H under the modified contract, i.e. âHL ∈ αH(ĈL). Given no discounting, it is also
immediate that the surplus generated by type L is unchanged by the modification. It thus follows that the
value of (P2) is unchanged by the modification. This procedure can be applied iteratively to all lockout
periods to produce a connected contract.
C.3. Step 3: Optimal deviation action plans for the high type
By the previous steps, we can restrict our attention to connected penalty contractsCL = (TL,WL0 , l
L) that
induce effort from the low type in each period t ∈ {1, . . . , TL}. We now describe properties of an optimal
connected penalty contract for the low type (Step 3a) and an optimal action plan for the high type when
taking the low type’s contract (Step 3b).
Step 3a: Consider an optimal connected penalty contract for type L,CL = (TL,WL0 , l
L). The next two
lemmas describe properties of such a contract.
Lemma 1. Suppose that CL = (TL,WL0 , l
L) is an optimal contract for type L. Then for any t = 1, . . . , TL, there
exists an optimal action plan a ∈ αH (CL) such that at = 1.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that for some τ ∈ {1, . . . , TL} , aτ = 0 for all a ∈ αH (CL). For any ε > 0,
define a contractCL (ε) = (TL,WL0 , l
L(ε)) modified fromCL = (TL,WL0 , l
L) as follows: (i) lLτ (ε) = lLτ −ε;
(ii) lLτ−1 (ε) = lLτ−1 + ε
(
1− λL); and (iii) lLt (ε) = lLt if t /∈ {τ − 1, τ}. We derive a contradiction by showing
that for small enough ε > 0,CL (ε) together with an original optimal contract for typeH ,CH , is feasible in




satisfy (ICLa ) and (ICHa ).
To evaluate how the objective changes when CL (ε) is used instead of CL, we thus only need to consider




We first claim that αH
(
CL (ε)
) ⊆ αH (CL) when ε is small enough. To see this, fix any a ∈ αH(CL).










+ η for any a′ /∈ αH (CL) . Since UH0 (CL (ε) ,a′) is continuous in ε, it follows









a′ /∈ αH (CL(ε)). It follows that αH (CL (ε)) ⊆ αH (CL).




















Hence, CL (ε) strictly improves the objective relative to CL. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2. Suppose that CL = (TL,WL0 , l
L) is an optimal contract for type L and there is some τ ∈ {1, . . . , TL}




. Then (ICLa ) binds at τ.
Proof. Recall from (ICLa ) that aL = 1. Suppose to the contrary that (ICLa ) is not binding at some τ but




. For any ε > 0, define a contract CL (ε) = (TL,WL0 , l
L(ε)) modified from
CL = (TL,WL0 , l
L) as follows: (i) lLτ (ε) = lLτ + ε; (ii) lLτ−1 (ε) = lLτ−1 − ε
(
1− λL); and (iii) lLt (ε) = lLt if
t /∈ {τ − 1, τ}. We derive a contradiction by showing that for small enough ε > 0, CL (ε) together with an
original optimal contract for type H , CH , is feasible in [P2] and strictly improves the objective. Note that
by construction (ICLa ) is still satisfied under CL (ε) at t = 1, . . . , τ − 1, τ + 1, . . . , TL. Moreover, since (ICLa )
is slack at τ under contract CL, it continues to be slack at τ under CL(ε) for ε small enough.
Now for small enough ε, take any a ∈ αH (CL(ε)) ⊆ αH (CL), where the subset inequality follows



















) [− (1− λL)+ (1− λH)]}






Hence, CL(ε) strictly improves the objective relative to CL. Q.E.D.
Step 3b: For any a ∈ αH (CL) and s < t, define





1− λH)∑τn=s+1 an .
The next lemma describes properties of any action plan a ∈ αH (CL).
Lemma 3. Suppose a ∈ αH (CL) and s < t.
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(1) If D (s, t,a) > 0 and as = 1, then at = 1.
(2) If D (s, t,a) < 0 and as = 0, then at = 0.
(3) If D (s, t,a) = 0, then a′ ∈ αH (CL) where a′s = at, a′t = as, and a′τ = aτ if τ 6= s, t.
Proof. Consider the first case of D (s, t,a) > 0. Suppose to the contrary that for some optimal action plan
a and two periods s < t, we have D (s, t,a) > 0 and as = 1 but at = 0. Consider an action plan a′ such
that a′ and a agree except that a′s = 0 and a′t = 1. That is,
a = (· · · , 1︸︷︷︸
period s
, · · · , 0︸︷︷︸
period t
, · · · ),
a′ = (· · · , 0︸︷︷︸
period s
, · · · , 1︸︷︷︸
period t









)− UHs (CL,a′) = −βHs λH∑t−1τ=s lLτ (1− λH)∑τn=s+1 an = −βHs λHD (s, t,a) .
The intuition for this expression is as follows. Since action plans a and a′ have the same number of
working periods, the assumption of no discounting implies that neither the effort costs nor the penalty
sequence matters for the difference in utilities conditional on the bad state. Conditional on the good state,
the effort costs again do not affect the difference in utilities; however, the probability with which the agent




) − UHs (CL,a′) < 0 if D (s, t,a) > 0. But this contradicts the assumption that a
is optimal; hence, the claim in part (1) follows. The proof of part (2) is analogous.








= 0 from the argument above; hence, both a and a′ are optimal. The case of as = 0 and at = 1
is analogous. Q.E.D.
C.4. Step 4: Stopping strategies for the high type
We use the following concepts to characterize the solution to [P2]:
Definition 1. An action plan a is a stopping strategy (that stops at t) if there exists t ≥ 1 such that as = 1
for s ≤ t and as = 0 for s > t.
Definition 2. An optimal action plan for type θ under contract C, a ∈ αθ(C), has the most-work prop-
erty (or is a most-work optimal strategy) if no other optimal action plan under the contract has more work
periods; that is, for all a′ ∈ αθ(C), # {n : an = 1} ≥ # {n : a′n = 1}.
Step 3 described properties of optimal contracts for the low type and optimal action plans for the high
type under the low type’s contract. We now use these properties to show that in solving program [P2], we
can restrict attention to connected penalty contracts for the low type CL = (TL,WL0 , l
L) such that there is
an optimal action plan for the high type under the contract a ∈ αH(CL) that is a stopping strategy with
the most work property.
55
Let N = mina∈αH(CL) # {n : an = 0} . That is, among all action plans that are optimal for type H
under contract CL, the action plan in which type H works the largest number of periods involves type




a ∈ AN : at = 0 for all t > TL − k
}
,
i.e. any a ∈ AN,k contains a total of N shirking periods, (at least) k of which are in the tail.
Our goal is to establish the following:
for any k < N : AN,k 6= ∅ =⇒
N⋃
n=k+1
AN,n 6= ∅. (C.3)
In other words, wheneverAN contains an action plan that has k < N shirks in the tail,AN must contain an
action plan that has at least k+1 shirks in the tail. By induction, this impliesAN,N 6= ∅, which is equivalent
to the existence of an optimal action plan that is a stopping strategy with the most work property.
Suppose to contradiction that (C.3) is not true; i.e. there is some k < N such that AN,k 6= ∅ and yet⋃N
n=k+1AN,n = ∅. Then there exists
tˆ = min
{
t : a ∈ AN,k, at = 0, t < TL − k, as = 1 for each s = t+ 1, . . . , TL − k
}
. (C.4)
In words, tˆ is the smallest shirking period preceding a working period such that there is an optimal action
plan a ∈ AN,k with k+ 1 shirking periods from (including) tˆ. Now take tˆ0 = tˆ. For n = 0, 1, . . . , whenever{
t : at = 0,a ∈ AN,k, t < tˆn
} 6= ∅, define
tˆn+1 = min
{







uniquely pins down an action profile â ∈ AN,k. In words, among all effort profiles in
AN,k, â has the earliest n-th shirk for each n = 1, ..., N. Note that â takes the following form:
period: tˆ tˆ+ 1 · · · TL − k TL − k + 1 · · ·
â: 0 1 · · · 1 0 · · ·
We will prove that
⋃N
n=k+1AN,n 6= ∅ (contradicting the hypothesis above) by showing that we can “move”
the shirking in period tˆ of â to the end. This is done via three lemmas.
Lemma 4. Suppose AN,k 6= ∅ and
⋃N
n=k+1AN,n = ∅. Then lLt = 0 for any t = tˆ+ 1, . . . , TL − k − 1.
Proof. We proceed by induction. Take any t ∈ {tˆ+ 1, . . . , TL − k − 1} and assume that lLs = 0 for
s = t+ 1, . . . , TL − k − 1. We show that lLt = 0.
Step 1: lLt ≥ 0.
Proof of Step 1: Suppose not, i.e., lLt < 0. Then the fact that (ICLa ) is satisfied at period t + 1 and the
hypothesis that lLt < 0 imply that (ICLa ) is slack at period t.54 Hence, by Lemma 2, there exists an action
plan a′ ∈ αH (CL) such that a′t = 0. Now, by the assumption that lLt < 0 together with the induction






s < 0 for m ∈ {t, . . . , TL − k − 1}. By Lemma 3, part (2), a′s = 0 for any
s = t, . . . , TL − k. Thus, a′ ∈ αH (CL) is as follows:
period: tˆ tˆ+ 1 · · · t t+ 1 · · · TL − k − 1 TL − k TL − k + 1 · · ·
â: 0 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 0 · · ·
a′: 0 0 · · · 0 0
Claim 1: There exists s∗ > TL − k such that a′s∗ = 1.
Proof : Suppose not. Then a′s = 0 for all s ≥ TL − k (recall a′TL−k = 0). We claim this implies
# {n : a′n = 0} > N . To see this, note that # {n : a′n = 0} ≥ N by assumption. If # {n : a′n = 0} = N, then
a′ ∈ AN , and since a′ contains k + 1 shirking periods in its tail, it follows that a′ ∈ AN,k+1, contradicting
the assumption that
⋃N




TL−k(â) and taking a
′
TL−k = 1 is optimal, a contradiction. ‖
Now let s∗ be the first such working period after TL − k. Then,
period: tˆ tˆ+ 1 · · · t t+ 1 · · · TL − k − 1 TL − k TL − k + 1 · · · s∗ · · ·
â: 0 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 0 · · · 0 · · ·
a′: 0 0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 1




s = 0. Now applying part (3)
of Lemma 3, we obtain that the agent is indifferent between a′ and a′′ where a′′ differs from a′ only
by switching the actions in period TL − k and period s∗. But since ∑TL−k−1s=t lLs < 0, the optimality of
a′′t = 0, a′′TL−k = 1 contradicts part (2) of Lemma 3.
Step 2: lLt ≤ 0.
Proof of Step 2: Assume to the contrary that lLt > 0. We have two cases to consider.
Case 1: lL
TL−k ≥ 0.






1− λH)∑sn=t+1 ân > 0.
Therefore, by part (1) of Lemma 3, âTL−k+1 = 1. But this contradicts the definition of â.
Case 2: lL
TL−k < 0.
In this case, (ICLa ) must be slack in period TL−k (since it is satisfied in the next period and lLTL−k < 0).
Hence by Lemma 2, there exists a˜ such that a˜TL−k = 0.
period: tˆ tˆ+ 1 · · · t t+ 1 · · · TL − k − 1 TL − k · · ·
â: 0 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 · · ·
a˜: 0
Claim 2: a˜s = 0 for any s > TL − k.
Proof : Suppose the claim is not true. Then define
τ := min
{




This is shown in the following table:
period: tˆ tˆ+ 1 · · · t t+ 1 · · · TL − k − 1 TL − k · · · τ − 1 τ · · ·
â: 0 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 0 0 · · ·
a˜: 0 · · · 0 1
Applying parts (1) and (2) of Lemma 3 to â and a˜ respectively, we obtain∑τ−1
s=TL−k l
L
s = 0. (C.6)




1− λH)∑sn=t+1 ân > 0. (C.7)






1− λH)∑sn=t+1 ân > 0.
Now applying part (1) of Lemma 3 to â, we reach the conclusion that âτ = 1, a contradiction. ‖
Hence, we have established the claim that a˜s = 0 for all s > TL − k, as depicted below:
period: tˆ tˆ+ 1 · · · t t+ 1 · · · TL − k − 1 TL − k · · · τ − 1 τ · · ·
â: 0 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 0 0 · · ·
a˜: 0 · · · 0 0 · · ·
Claim 3: # {n : a˜n = 0} = N + 1 and βHTL−k (a˜) = βHTL−k (â) .
Proof : By definition of N, # {n : a˜n = 0} ≥ N. If # {n : a˜n = 0} = N, then a˜ contains k + 1 shirking
periods in its tail, contradicting the assumption thatAN,k+1 = ∅. Moreover, if # {n : a˜n = 0} > N+1, then
βH
TL−k (a˜) > β
H
TL−k (â) . But then since âTL−k = 1, we should have a˜TL−k = 1, a contradiction. Therefore,
it must be # {n : a˜n = 0} = N + 1. ‖
By Claim 3, we can choose a˜ such that a˜ differs from â only in period TL − k. This is shown in the
following table:
period: tˆ tˆ+ 1 · · · t t+ 1 · · · TL − k − 1 TL − k · · · τ − 1 τ · · ·
â: 0 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 0 0 · · ·
a˜: 0 1 · · · 1 1 · · · 1 0 · · · 0 0 · · ·





1− λH)∑sn=t+1 a˜n > 0.
Applying part (1) of Lemma 3, we must conclude that a˜TL−k = 1, a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Lemma 5. Suppose AN,k 6= ∅ and
⋃N
m=k+1AN,m = ∅. Then lLtˆ = 0.




Proof of Step 1: To the contrary, suppose lL
tˆ





1− λH)∑sn=tˆ+1 ân < 0.




Proof of Step 2: Suppose to the contrary that lL
tˆ
> 0. Note that by Lemma 1, there exists an action plan
a′ ∈ αH (CL) such that a′
tˆ
= 1. Then since, by Lemma 4, lLt = 0 for t = tˆ + 1, . . . , TL − k − 1, it follows
from part (1) of Lemma 3 that a′s = 1 for s = tˆ+ 1, . . . , TL − k. Hence, we obtain the following table:
period: tˆ tˆ+ 1 · · · TL − k − 1 TL − k TL − k + 1 · · ·
â: 0 1 · · · 1 1 0 · · ·
a′: 1 1 · · · 1 1
Claim: there exists t˜ < tˆ, such that a′
t˜
= 0 and ât˜ = 1.
Proof : since # {t : a′t = 0} ≥ N = # {t : ât = 0}, a′tˆ = 1, âtˆ = 0, and ât = 0 for all t > TL − k, we have
#
{




t : ât = 0, t < tˆ
}
. The claim follows immediately.
We can take t˜ to be the largest period that satisfies the above claim. Hence â and a′ are as follows:
period: t˜ · · · tˆ tˆ+ 1 · · · TL − k − 1 TL − k TL − k + 1 · · ·
â: 1 0 1 · · · 1 1 0 · · ·
a′: 0 1 1 · · · 1 1
There are two cases to consider.
Case 1: ât = a′t for each t = t˜+ 1, . . . , tˆ− 1.





1− λH)∑sn=t˜+1 ân = 0 and the agent is indifferent between â and â′
where â′ differs from â only in that the actions at periods t˜ and tˆ are switched. But this contradicts the
definition of tˆ (see (C.4)).
Case 2: âm = 0 and a′m = 1 for some m ∈
{
t˜+ 1, . . . , tˆ− 1} .
First note that Case 1 and Case 2 are exhaustive because t˜ is taken to be the largest period t < tˆ such
that ât = 1 and a′t = 0. Without loss, we take m to be the smallest possible. Hence ât = a′t for each
t = t˜+ 1, . . . ,m− 1. Then â and a′ are as follows:
period: t˜ · · · m · · · tˆ tˆ+ 1 · · · TL − k − 1 TL − k TL − k + 1 · · ·
â: 1 0 0 1 · · · 1 1 0 · · ·
a′: 0 1 1 1 · · · 1 1
But again, by Lemma 3, we can switch the actions at periods t˜ and m in â, contradicting the definition of
â (see (C.5)). Q.E.D.
Lemma 6. If AN,k 6= ∅ then
⋃N
n=k+1AN,n 6= ∅.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that
⋃N
n=k+1AN,n = ∅. Then lLt = 0 for t = tˆ, . . . , TL − k − 1, by Lemma 4
and Lemma 5. Therefore, by part (3) of Lemma 3, we can switch âtˆ with âTL−k to obtain â
′. However, since
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# {t : â′t = 0} = # {t : ât = 0} = N, it follows immediately that â′ ∈ AN . Since â′t = 0 for all t > TL−k−1,
â′ ∈ ⋃Nn=k+1AN,n. Q.E.D.
C.5. Step 5: Onetime-penalty contracts for the low type
In Step 4, we showed that we can restrict attention in solving program [P2] to connected penalty contracts
for the low typeCL = (TL,WL0 , l
L) such that there is an optimal action plan for the high type a ∈ αH(CL)
that is a stopping strategy with the most work property. We now use this result to show that we can




This result is proved via two lemmas.
Lemma 7. Let CL = (TL,WL0 , l
L) be an optimal contract for the low type with a most-work optimal stopping
strategy for the high type â that stops at tˆ, i.e. tˆ = max{t ∈ {1, . . . , TL} : ât = 1}. For each t > tˆ, there is an
optimal action plan, a˜ ∈ αH(CL), such that for any s, âs = a˜s ⇐⇒ s /∈ {tˆ, t}.
Proof. Step 1: First, we show that the Lemma’s claim is true for some t > tˆ (rather than for all t > tˆ).
Suppose not, to contradiction. Then Lemma 3 implies that
for any n ∈ {tˆ, tˆ+ 1, . . . , TL − 1},
n∑
s=tˆ
lLs < 0. (C.8)
Hence, (ICLa ) is slack at tˆ (since it is satisfied in the next period and lLtˆ < 0) and, by Lemma 2, there exists
an optimal action plan, a′′, with a′′
tˆ
= 0.
Claim 1: a′′s = 0 for all s > tˆ.
Proof: Suppose to contradiction that there exists τ > tˆ such that a′′τ = 1. Take the smallest such τ . Then
it follows from Lemma 3 applied to â and a′′ that
τ−1∑
s=tˆ
lLs = 0, contradicting (C.8). ‖
Hence, we obtain that a′′s = 0 for all s ≥ tˆ, and it follows from the optimality of âtˆ = 1 and a′′tˆ = 0 that
a′′ is a stopping strategy that stops at tˆ− 1:
period: · · · tˆ− 2 tˆ− 1 tˆ tˆ+ 1 tˆ+ 2 · · ·
â: · · · 1 1 1 0 0 · · ·
a′′: · · · 1 1 0 0 0 · · ·








= 0. Then by (C.8) and Lemma 3, a′
tˆ+1
= 0. But then again by (C.8) and Lemma 3,
a′
tˆ+2
= 0, and using induction we arrive at the conclusion that a′
TL
= 0. Contradiction. ‖
Since a′
TL
= 1 and a′
tˆ
= 1, by the most work property of â, there must exist a period m < tˆ such that
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a′m = 0. Take the largest such period:
period: · · · m m+ 1 · · · tˆ− 1 tˆ tˆ+ 1 tˆ+ 2 · · · TL
â: · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 0 0 · · · 0
a′′: · · · 1 1 · · · 1 0 0 0 · · · 0
a′: 0 1 · · · 1 1 1





1− λH)∑sn=m+1 a′n = 0. Hence, there exists an optimal






= 1, (C.8), and Lemma 3.
Step 2: We now prove the Lemma’s claim for tˆ+1. That is, we show that there exists an optimal action
plan, call it âtˆ+1, such that for any s, âtˆ+1s = âs ⇐⇒ s /∈ {tˆ, tˆ + 1}. Suppose, to contradiction, that the
claim is false. Then, by Lemma 3, lL
tˆ
< 0. Using Step 1, there is some τ > tˆ that satisfies the Lemma’s
claim; let aτ be the corresponding optimal action plan (which is identical to â in exactly all periods except
from tˆ and τ ). Since by Lemma 1 there exists an optimal action plan, call it a′, with a′
tˆ+1
= 1, Lemma 3 and
lL
tˆ
< 0 imply a′
tˆ
= 1. By the most work property of â, there must exist a period m < tˆ such that a′m = 0.
Take the largest such period:
period: · · · m m+ 1 · · · tˆ− 1 tˆ tˆ+ 1 · · · τ τ + 1 · · ·
â: · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 0 · · · 0 0 · · ·
aτ : · · · 1 1 · · · 1 0 0 · · · 1 0 · · ·
a′: 0 1 · · · 1 1 1






1− λH)∑sn=m+1 a′n = 0. Hence, there exists an optimal








< 0, and Lemma 3.
Step 3: Finally, we use induction to prove that the Lemma’s claim is true for any s > tˆ + 1. (Note
the claim is true for tˆ + 1 by Step 2.) Take any t + 1 ∈ {tˆ + 2, . . . , TL}. Assume the claim is true for
s = tˆ+ 2, . . . , t. We show that the claim is true for t+ 1.
By Step 2 and the induction hypothesis, there exists an optimal action plan, ât, such that for any s,
âts = âs ⇐⇒ s /∈ {tˆ, t}. We shall show that there exists an optimal action plan, ât+1, such that for any
s, ât+1s = âs ⇐⇒ s /∈ {tˆ, t + 1}. Suppose, to contradiction, that the claim is false. Note that Step 2, the
induction hypothesis, and Lemma 3 imply lLs = 0 for all s = tˆ, . . . , t−1. It thus follows from Lemma 3 and
the claim being false that lLt < 0. By Lemma 1 there exists an optimal action plan, call it a′, with a′t+1 = 1.
Then Lemma 3 and lLt < 0 imply that a′t = 1.
Claim 3: a′s = 1 for all s = tˆ, . . . , t− 1.
Proof: Suppose to contradiction that a′s∗ = 0 for some s∗ ∈ {tˆ, . . . , t − 1}. Then since lLs = 0 for all
s = tˆ, . . . , t − 1, by Lemma 3, there exists an optimal action plan, a′′, obtained from a′ by switching a′s∗
and a′t. But then the optimality of a′′ contradicts a′′t = 0, a′′t+1 = 1, lLt < 0, and Lemma 3. ‖
Hence, we obtain a′s = 1 for all s = tˆ, . . . , t+ 1, and by the most work property of â, there must exist a
period m < tˆ such that a′m = 0. Take the largest such period:
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period: · · · m m+ 1 · · · tˆ− 1 tˆ tˆ+ 1 · · · t t+ 1 · · ·
â : · · · 1 1 · · · 1 1 0 · · · 0 0 · · ·
ât : · · · 1 1 · · · 1 0 0 · · · 1 0 · · ·
a′: · · · 0 1 · · · 1 1 1 · · · 1 1











1− λH)∑sn=m+1 a′n = 0. Hence, by Lemma 3, there exists an optimal action plan a′′
obtained from a′ by switching a′m and a′t. But then the optimality of a′′ contradicts a′′t = 0, a′′t+1 = 1,
lLt < 0, and Lemma 3. Q.E.D.
Lemma 8. If CL is an optimal contract for the low type with a most-work optimal stopping strategy for the high
type, then CL is a onetime-penalty contract.
Proof. FixCL per the Lemma’s assumptions. Let â and tˆ be as defined in the statement of Lemma 7. Then,
it immediately follows from Lemma 7 and Lemma 3 that lLt = 0 for all t ∈ {tˆ, tˆ + 1, . . . , TL − 1}. We use
induction to prove that lLt = 0 for all t < tˆ.
Assume lLt = 0 for all t ∈ {m+ 1,m+ 2, . . . , TL− 1} for m < tˆ. We will show that lLm = 0. First, lLm > 0





1− λH)∑sn=m+1 ân > 0 (by Lemma 7 and the inductive assumption),
contradicting the optimality of â and Lemma 3. Second, we claim lLm < 0 is not possible. Suppose, to
contradiction, that lLm < 0. Then (ICLa ) is slack at m and, by Lemma 2, there exists an optimal plan a′





(â), and thus the optimality of â implies that a′ is suboptimal at tˆ, a contradiction. Q.E.D.
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D. Supplementary Appendix for Online Publication Only
D.1. Proof of Proposition 1
We prove the result more generally for contracts with lockouts. Fix a contract C = (Γ,W0, b, l). The result
is trivial if Γ = ∅, so assume Γ 6= ∅. Let T = max Γ. For any period t ∈ Γ with t < T , define the smallest
successor period in Γ as σ(t) = min{t′ : t′ > t, t′ ∈ Γ}; moreover, let σ(0) = min Γ.
Given any action profile for the agent, the agent’s time-zero expected discounted payoff when his
type is θ ∈ {L,H} and the principal’s time-zero expected discounted payoff only depend upon a con-
tract’s induced vector of discounted transfers, say (τt)t∈Γ when success is obtained in period t and on the
discounted transfer when there is no success. Hence, it suffices to construct a penalty contract, Ĉ, and
bonus contract, C˜, that induce the same such vector of transfers as C.
To this end, define the penalty contract Ĉ = (Γ, Ŵ0, l̂) as follows:
(a) For any t such that t < T and t ∈ Γ, l̂t = lt − bt + δσ(t)−tbσ(t).
(b) l̂T = lT − bT .
(c) Ŵ0 = W0 + δσ(0)bσ(0).
Define the bonus contract C˜ = (Γ, W˜0, b˜) as follows:








Consider first the discounted transfer induced by each of these three contracts if success is not ob-
tained. For C, it is W0 +
∑
t∈Γ δ










lt − bt + δσ(t)−tbσ(t)
)




where the first equality follows from the definition of Ĉ and the second from algebraic simplification. For




all three contracts induce the same transfer in the event of no success.
Next, for any s ∈ Γ, consider a success obtained in period s. The discounted transfer in this event in






















where again the first equality uses the definition of Ĉ and the second follows from simplification. For C˜,
since there are no penalties, the corresponding discounted transfer is
W˜0 + δ
















where again the first equality is by definition of C˜ and the second from simplification. Hence, all three
contracts induce the same transfer in the event of success in any period s ∈ Γ.
D.2. Proof of Proposition 2
We use a monotone comparative statics argument. Recall expression (B.20), which was the portion of the
principal’s objective that involves a stopping time for the low type, T :
V (T, β0, µ0, c, δ, λ

























1− λH)t−1 − (1− λL)t−1]
 ,
where lLt (T ) is given by (6) in Theorem 3. The second-best stopping time, t
L, is the T that maximizes
V (T, ·).55 To establish the comparative statics of tL with respect to the parameters, we show that V (T, ·)
has increasing or decreasing differences in T and the relevant parameter.
Substituting lLt (T ) from (6) into V (·) above yields
V (T, β0, µ0, c, δ, λ



































1− λH)t−1 − (1− λL)t−1]

. (D.1)
After some algebraic manipulation, we obtain
V (T + 1, β0, µ0, c, δ, λ













1− λH)T (λH − λL)
 . (D.2)
55 While the maximizer is generically unique, recall that if multiple maximizers exist we select the largest one.
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(D.2) implies that V (T, β0, µ0, c, δ, λL, λH) has increasing differences in (T, β0), because
∂
∂β0
[V (T + 1, β0, ·)− V (T, β0, ·)] = δT+1
 (1− µ0)
[(





1− λH)T (λH − λL)
 > 0.
It thus follows that tL is increasing in β0. Similarly, (D.2) also implies
∂
∂c
[V (T + 1, c, ·)− V (T, c, ·)] = δT+1











1− λH)T (λH − λL)
 < 0,
and hence tL is decreasing in c.
To obtain the comparative static of tL in µ0, we compute
∂
∂µ0












1− λH)T (λH − λL)
 . (D.3)




λL ≥ c, which is equivalent to
β0
(
1− λL)tL−1 (λL − c)− (1− β0) c ≥ 0. Thus, for T + 1 ≤ tL,
β0
(
1− λL)T (λL − c)− (1− β0) c ≥ 0. (D.4)
Combining (D.3) and (D.4) implies
∂
∂µ0
[V (T + 1, µ0, ·)− V (T, µ0, ·)] ≤ −δT+1c
β0
(
1− λL)T + 1− β0
(1− λL)T λL
(
1− λH)T (λH − λL) < 0.
It follows that tL is decreasing in µ0.
We next consider the comparative statics of tL with respect to λL and λH . For λL, note that since
T + 1 ≤ tL and the first-best stopping time is increasing in ability starting at λL, the social surplus from
the low type (given by the expression in the first square brackets in (D.1)) has increasing differences in








































)  > 0,
which implies that tL is increasing in λL.
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V (T + 1, λH , ·)− V (T, λH , ·)] = −δT+1µ0cβ0 (1− λL)T + 1− β0
(1− λL)T λL
[(
1− λH)T − T (1− λH)T−1 (λH − λL)] ,
whose sign can vary with parameters. Specifically, let (β0, µ0, c, δ, λL) = (0.95, 0.1, 0.215, 0.8, 0.25), which
results in a first-best stopping time tL = 5. Consider three values of λH : λH1 = 0.45, λ
H
2 = 0.5, and
λH3 = 0.55. The corresponding first-best stopping times are t
H
1 = 6, t
H
2 = 5, and t
H
3 = 5. One can verify
that the low type’s second-best stopping time, tL, increases (from 3 to 4) when λH increases from λH1 to
λH2 while it decreases (from 4 to 0) when λ
H increases from λH2 to λ
H
3 .
Finally, consider the comparative statics of the distortion, tL − tL. By (3), tL is independent of µ0 and
λH , while we have just shown that tL is decreasing in µ0 and can increase or decrease in λH . Therefore,
tL− tL is increasing in µ0 and can increase or decrease in λH depending on parameters. To see that tL− tL
can increase or decrease in β0 as well, take the set of parameters considered in Figure 2, (µ0, c, δ, λL, λH) =
(0.3, 0.06, 0.5, 0.1, 0.12). The figure shows that given these parameters, tL− tL decreases (from 12− 10 = 2
to 15− 14 = 1) when β0 increases from 0.85 to 0.89. If instead we take these parameter values but change
only µ0 to µ0 = 0.7, we find that the same increase in β0 leads to an increase in tL − tL (from 12− 1 = 11
to 15 − 1 = 14). The comparative static of tL − tL with respect to c and λL can be shown by similar
computations.
D.3. Step 6 of Proof of Theorem 5
We remind the reader that Steps 1–5 of the proof of Theorem 5 are in Appendix C of the paper.
By the previous steps in the proof, we restrict attention to onetime-penalty contracts for the low type
such that the low type works in all periods t ∈ {1, . . . , TL} and the high type has a most-work optimal
stopping strategy. For an arbitrary such contract CL, let tˆ(CL) denote the high type’s most-work optimal
stopping time, i.e. tˆ(CL) := max{t ∈ {1, . . . , TL} : âs = 1 for all s = 1, . . . , t, â ∈ αH(CL)}. We now show




where tˆ(CL) is given by
THL(TL) := min
{


















When not essential, we suppress the dependence of tˆ(CL) on CL. We proceed by proving five claims.
Claim 1: Given any onetime-penalty contract CL = (TL,WL0 , l
L
TL
), −βHtˆ+1λH lLTL < c.
Proof: Suppose to contradiction that−βHtˆ+1λH lLTL ≥ c. Then typeH is willing to work one more period
after having worked for tˆ periods, contradicting the definition of tˆ. ‖
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Claim 2: Given an optimal onetime-penalty contract CL = (TL,WL0 , l
L
TL
), (1− λH)tˆ ≤ (1− λL)TL .
Proof: Suppose to contradiction that given an optimal contract CL = (TL,WL0 , l
L
TL
), type H’s most-
work optimal stopping time tˆ is such that (1 − λH)tˆ > (1 − λL)TL . Then for any strategy a˜ ∈ αH(CL)
where type H works for a total of t˜ periods, (1− λH)t˜ > (1− λL)TL . Now note that given CL and a˜, type






















(1− β0) + β0
(
1− λL)t−1] .
Consider a modification that reduces lL
TL
by ε > 0. By Claim 1, for ε small enough, this modification does
not affect incentives, and by (1−λH)t˜ > (1−λL)TL , the modification strictly reduces typeH’s information
rent. But then CL cannot be optimal. ‖
Claim 3: In any onetime-penalty contract CL = (TL,WL0 , l
L
TL




























some t ≤ TL, then tˆ(CL) ≥ t and 1 ∈ αL(CL).














. Then type L is not willing
to work for TL periods; having worked for TL − 1 periods, type L’s incentive compatibility constraint











. Then typeH is not willing to work for tˆ periods; having worked for tˆ−1 periods, type
H is willing to work one more period only if −βLtˆ λH lLTL ≥ c, which is not satisfied with lLTL > − cβHtˆ λL .















. Consider first type L. The
proof is by induction. Consider the last period, TL. Since no matter the history of effort the current belief
is some βL
TL
≥ βLTL , it is immediate that −βLTLλLlLTL ≥ c, and thus it is optimal for type L to work in the
last period. Now assume inductively that it is optimal for type L to work in period t+ 1 ≤ TL no matter
the history of effort, and consider period t with belief βLt . The inductive hypothesis implies that
− βLt+1λL





 ≥ c. (D.6)
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Therefore, at period t:
−βLt λL
−c+ (1− λL)

















Finally, consider type H . By Lemma 3 and the fact that lLt = 0 for all t = 1, . . . , TL − 1, type H is
indifferent between any two action plans a and a′ such that # {t : at = 0} = # {t : a′t = 0}. Thus, without
loss, we restrict attention to stopping strategies, and we only need to show that it is optimal for type H
to stop at s ≥ t. Note that for any s < t, given that type H has worked consecutively until and including
period s, −βHs+1λH lLTL ≥ c, and thus type H does not want to stop at s. ‖




















Proof: Suppose, to contradiction, the claim is false. Given an optimal onetime-penalty contract for
type L, CL = (TL,WL0 , l
L
TL














(1− β0) + β0
(
1− λL)t−1] .
Consider a modification that increases lL
TL
by ε > 0. By Claim 4 being false and Claim 3, for ε small
enough, working in all periods t = 1, . . . , TL remains optimal for type L, and â remains optimal for type
H . But then Claim 2 implies that type H’s information rent either goes down or remains unchanged with
the modification, and thus there exists an optimal contract CL = (TL,WL0 , l
L
TL
) where the claim is true. ‖
Claim 5: There is an optimal onetime-penalty contract CL = (TL,WL0 , l
L
TL
) with tˆ(CL) = THL(TL).
Proof: Take an arbitrary optimal contract CL = (TL,WL0 , l
L
TL







L. By Claim 2, tˆ(CL) satisfies (1 − λH)tˆ(CL) ≤ (1 − λL)TL . Thus, all that remains
to be shown is that there exists CL where tˆ(CL) is the smallest period t ∈ {1, . . . , TL} that satisfies
these two conditions. Suppose to contradiction that this claim is false. Then tˆ(CL) − 1 also satisfies
the conditions; that is, βHtˆ(CL)λH < β
L
TLλ
































follows that type H’s incentive constraint in period tˆ(CL) binds; i.e., type H is indifferent between work-
ing and shirking at tˆ(CL) given that he has worked in all periods t = 1, . . . , tˆ(CL)− 1 and will shirk in all
periods t = tˆ(CL)+1, . . . , TL. Hence, both a stopping strategy that stops at tˆ(CL) and a stopping strategy
that stops at tˆ(CL) − 1 are optimal for type H given CL, and type H’s information rent is the same for
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(1− β0) + β0
(
1− λL)t−1] .
Now consider a modified contract, ĈL, obtained fromCL by increasing lL
TL





















, for ε small enough, 1 ∈ αL(ĈL) and a stopping strategy that stops at tˆ(CL) − 1
remains optimal for type H under ĈL. Then tˆ(ĈL) = tˆ(CL)− 1, and since (1− λH)tˆ(CL)−1 ≤ (1− λL)TL ,
type H’s information rent either goes down or remains unchanged with the modification, so ĈL is opti-
mal. If tˆ(ĈL) = THL(TL), we are done. Otherwise, we can apply the argument to tˆ(ĈL) and repeat until
we eventually arrive at the desired contract CL with tˆ(CL) = THL. ‖
D.4. Details for Subsection 7.1
Here we provide a formal result for the discussion in Subsection 7.1 of the paper.
Theorem 7. Even if project success is privately observed by the agent, the menus of contracts identified in Theorems
3–6 remain optimal and implement the same outcome as when project success is publicly observable.
Proof. It suffices to show that in each of the menus, each of the contracts would induce the agent (of either
type) to reveal project success immediately when it is obtained. Consider first the menus of Theorem 3
and Theorem 5: for each θ ∈ {L,H}, the contract for type θ, Cθ, is a penalty contract in which lθt ≤ 0
for all t. Hence, no matter which contract the agent takes and no matter his type, it is optimal to reveal
a success when obtained. For the implementation in Theorem 4, observe from (8) that type L’s bonus
contract has the property that δbLt+1 ≤ bLt for all t ∈ {1, . . . , tL − 1}; moreover, this property also holds in
type L’s bonus contract in Theorem 6 and in type H’s bonus contracts in both Theorem 4 and Theorem 6,
as these contracts are constant-bonus contracts. Hence, under all these contracts, it is optimal for the agent
of either type to disclose success immediately when obtained. Q.E.D.
D.5. Details for Subsection 7.2
Here we provide a formal result for the discussion in Subsection 7.2 of the paper.
Theorem 8. Assume tH > tL, δ = 1, and that all transfers must be non-negative. In any optimal menu of
contracts, each type θ ∈ {L,H} is induced to work for some number of periods, tθ``, where tL`` ≤ tH`` . Relative to
the first-best stopping times, tH and tL, the second best has tH`` ≤ tH and tL`` ≤ tL. The principal can implement
the second best using a bonus contract for type H , CH = (tH`` ,WH0 , b














2. Type H gets a rent: UH0 (C
H ,αH(CH)) > 0;
3. If tL`` > 0, type L gets a rent: UL0 (C
L,αL(CL)) > 0;
4. 1 ∈ αH(CH); 1 ∈ αL(CL); and 1 = αH(CL).














subject to, for all θ, θ′ ∈ {L,H},
aθ ∈ αθ(Cθ), (ICθa)
U θ0 (C
θ,aθ) ≥ 0, (IRθ)
U θ0 (C











t ≥ 0 for all t ∈ Γθ. (``θ)
Note that the limited liability constraint for type θ, (``θ), implies that this type’s participation con-
straint, (IRθ), is satisfied. From now on, we thus ignore the constraints (IRθ).
Step 1: Bonus contracts
We show that it is without loss to focus on bonus contracts. Suppose by contradiction that in the solution
to [P``], for some θ ∈ {L,H}, Cθ = (Γθ,W θ0 , bθ, lθ) is not a bonus contract, i.e. lθt 6= 0 for some t ∈ Γθ. We
can construct an equivalent bonus contract C˜θ = (Γθ, W˜ θ0 , b˜
θ) as in the proof of Proposition 1:










Note that by the limited liability constraint, Cθ has W θ0 ≥ 0 and lθt ≥ 0 for all t ∈ Γθ. Hence, C˜θ has
W˜ θ0 ≥ 0. Moreover, if b˜θt < 0 for some t ∈ Γθ, then regardless of his type, the agent shirks in period t under
contract C˜θ. Therefore, we can define another bonus contract, Ĉθ = (Γ̂θ, W˜ θ0 , b˜
θ), where t ∈ Γ̂θ if and
only if t ∈ Γθ and b˜θt ≥ 0. Since under contract C˜θ the agent of either type receives zero with probability
one in all periods t in which b˜θt < 0, the incentives for effort for both agent types and the payoffs for the
principal and both agent types are unchanged in the new contract Ĉθ in which the agent is locked out in
these periods. It follows that the bonus contract Ĉθ is equivalent to contract C˜θ and thus to the original
contract Cθ, and it satisfies limited liability.
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Step 2: Both types always work
We show that it is without loss to focus on bonus contracts in which each type is prescribed to work
in every period under his own contract. Suppose that there is a solution to [P``] in which, for some
θ ∈ {L,H}, Cθ = (Γθ,W θ0 , bθ) induces aθ 6= 1. Consider contract Ĉθ = (Γ̂θ,W θ0 , bθ) where t ∈ Γ̂θ if and
only if t ∈ Γθ and aθt = 1. Notice that in any period t in which type θ shirks under contractCθ, he receives
zero with probability one; this is the same type θ receives under contract Ĉθ where he is locked out in
period t. It follows that the incentives for effort for type θ and both the principal’s payoff from type θ and
type θ’s payoff do not change with the new contract. Moreover, observe that for type θ′ 6= θ, no matter
which action he would take at t in any optimal action plan under Cθ, his payoff from Ĉθ must be weakly
lower because the lockout in period t effectively forces him to shirk in period t and receive zero.
Step 3: Connected contracts
It is immediate that given δ = 1, it is without loss to focus on connected bonus contracts: under no
discounting, nothing changes when a period t /∈ Γθ is removed from type θ’s bonus contract, Cθ =
(Γθ,W θ0 , b
θ). When a lockout period is removed, the future sequence of transfers and effort is shifted up
by one period, but this has no effect on the payoffs of the principal and the agent of either type when
there is no discounting.
Step 4: Relaxing the principal’s program
By Steps 1-3, we restrict attention to connected bonus contracts that induce each agent type to work in
each period under his own contract. We now relax the principal’s problem [P``] by considering a weak
version of (ICHL) in which type H is assumed to exert effort in all periods t ∈ {1, . . . , TL} if he takes
contract CL. Ignoring the participation constraints as explained above and denoting the set of connected















1 ∈ αL(CL), (ICLa )








) ≥ UH0 (CL,1) , (Weak-ICHL)
WL0 , b
L
t ≥ 0 for all t ∈ {1, . . . , TL}, (``L)
WH0 , b
H
t ≥ 0 for all t ∈ {1, . . . , TH}. (``H )
We will solve this relaxed program and later verify that the solution is feasible in (and hence is a
solution to) [P``].
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Step 5: An optimal contract for the low type
Take any arbitrary connected bonus contract C = (T,W0, b). It follows from Step 3 of the proof of The-
orem 3 and the proof of Proposition 1 that type θ’s incentive constraint for effort binds in each period
t ∈ {1, . . . , T} under contract C if and only if b = bθ(T ), where bθ(T ) is defined as follows:
b
θ








for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T}. (D.7)
We can show that in solving program [RP``], it is without loss to restrict attention to constant-bonus
contracts for type L with bonus as defined in (D.7). The proof follows from Step 4 in the proof of Theo-
rem 3. Take any arbitrary connected bonus contract CL = (TL,WL0 , b
L) that induces type L to work in
each period t ∈ {1, . . . , TL}. We modify this contract into a constant-bonus contract ĈL = (TL, ŴL0 , b̂L)
where b̂L = bL(TL) and the modified initial transfer ŴL0 is such that U
L
0 (C
L,1) = UL0 (Ĉ
L,1). We can
show that this modification relaxes (Weak-ICHL) while keeping all other constraints in [RP``] unchanged,
and thus it allows to weakly increase the objective in [RP``]. We omit the details as the arguments are
analogous to those in Step 4 in the proof of Theorem 3.
Step 6: Under-experimentation and positive rents for both types
We first show that the solution to [RP``] does not induce over-experimentation by either type: TL ≤ tL
and TH ≤ tH . It is useful for our arguments to rewrite the principal’s payoff by substituting with (1); we












1− λL)t−1 λL (1− bLt )−WL0
 . (D.8)
Suppose per contra that a solution to [RP``] has a menu of connected bonus contracts (CL,CH) such
that T θ > tθ for some θ ∈ {L,H}. Without loss by Step 2,Cθ = (T θ,W θ0 , bθ) induces type θ to work in each
period t ∈ {1, . . . , T θ}. Note that by the arguments in Step 5, type θ’s incentive constraint for effort binds






for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T θ}; hence, contract Cθ must





for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T θ} and T θ > tθ implies bθt > 1 for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T θ}. Using (D.8), this
implies that the principal’s payoff from type θ is strictly negative if T θ > tθ. But then we can show that
there exists a menu of connected bonus contracts that satisfies all the constraints in [RP``] and yields the
principal a strictly larger payoff than the original menu (CL,CH). This is immediate if the original menu
induces both TL > tL and TH > tH , as the principal gets a strictly negative payoff from each type in this
case. Suppose instead that the original menu is (Cθ,Cθ
′
) with T θ ≤ tθ for type θ ∈ {L,H} and T θ′ > tθ′
for θ′ 6= θ. Then consider a menu (Ĉθ, Ĉθ′) where Ĉθ = Ĉθ′ = (T θ, 0, bθ(T θ)). This menu trivially satisfies
all the constraints in the principal’s program. Moreover, compared to the original menu, this menu yields
the principal a weakly larger payoff from type θ because it induces this type to work for the same periods
as Cθ with a (weakly) lower initial transfer and (weakly) lower bonuses in each period t ∈ {1, . . . , T θ},
and it yields the principal a strictly larger payoff from type θ′ because the payoff from this type under the
new menu is non-negative given that the bonus is bθ(T θ) ≤ 1 in each period t ∈ {1, . . . , T θ}.
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Next, we show that the solution to [RP``] yields a positive rent to type H (i.e. UH0 (C
H ,1) > 0) and
it also yields a positive rent to type L (i.e. UL0 (C
L,1) > 0) if type L is not excluded. By the limited
liability constraints (``L) and (``H ), UL0 (C
L,1) ≥ 0 and UH0 (CH ,1) ≥ 0. Moreover, given limited liability,
U θ0 (C
θ,1) = 0 for a type θ ∈ {L,H} implies T θ = 0. Hence, if type θ is not excluded, this type receives
a strictly positive rent. All that is left to be shown is that the solution to [RP``] cannot exclude type
H , and thus it always yields UH0 (C
H ,1) > 0. First, suppose that UL0 (C
L,1) > 0 and UH0 (C
H ,1) = 0.
Then since βHt λH > β
L
t λ
L for all t ≤ tL (by the assumption that tH > tL) and TL ≤ tL, it follows
that UH0 (C
L,1) > UL0 (C
L,1) > 0 = UH0 (C
H ,1), and thus (Weak-ICHL) is violated. Next, suppose that
U θ0 (C
θ,1) = 0 for both types θ ∈ {L,H}. Then T θ = 0 for both types θ ∈ {L,H} and the principal’s
payoff is zero. However, the principal can then strictly improve upon this menu by using a menu of
constant-bonus contracts ĈL = ĈH = (1, 0, bH(1)), where note that bH(1) < 1.
Step 7: The high type experiments more than the low type
We show that the solution to [RP``] must have TL ≤ TH . Suppose per contra that the solution is a
menu of connected bonus contracts {CL,CH} such that TL > TH . Without loss by Step 5, let CL =
(TL,WL0 , b
L
(TL)). Note that by (Weak-ICHL), UH0 (C
H ,1) ≥ UH0 (CL,1). Moreover, by Step 6, TL ≤ tL,
which in turn implies TL < tH . But then it is immediate that a menu (C˜L, C˜H) where C˜L = C˜H =
(TL, 0, b
L
(TL)) yields the same amount of experimentation by type L, strictly more efficient experimen-
tation by type H , and payoffs UL0 (C˜
L,1) ≤ UL0 (CL,1) and UH0 (C˜H ,1) ≤ UH0 (CH ,1), while satisfying all
the constraints in [RP``]. It follows that (C˜L, C˜H) yields a strictly larger payoff to the principal than the
original menu (CL,CH), which therefore cannot be optimal.
Step 8: Back to the original problem
We now show that the solution to the relaxed program [RP``] is feasible and thus a solution to the original
program [P``]. Recall that (given Steps 1-3) the only relaxation in program [RP``] relative to [P``] is that
[RP``] imposes (Weak-ICHL) instead of (ICHL). Thus, all we need to show is that given a constant-bonus
contract CL = (TL,WL0 , b
L
(TL)) with length TL ≤ tL, it would be optimal for type H to work in each
period 1, . . . , TL. The claim follows from Step 6 in the proof of Theorem 3 and the proof of Proposition 1.
Q.E.D.
D.6. Details for Subsection 7.3
Here we provide details for the discussion in Subsection 7.3 of the paper.
Assume β0 = 1 and for simplicity that there is some finite time, T , at which the game ends. Since
β
θ
t = 1 for all θ ∈ {L,H} and t ∈ {1, . . . , T}, the high type always has a higher expected marginal product
than the low type, i.e. βHt λH = λH > β
L
t λ
L = λL for all t. Consequently, the methodology used in proving
Theorem 3 can be applied, with the conclusions that if the optimal length of experimentation for the low
type is some T (constrained to be no larger than T ), the optimal penalty contract for the low type is given
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by the analog of (6) with βLt = 1 for all t:
lLt =
{
− (1− δ) c
λL
if t < T,
− c
λL
if t = T,
and the portion of the principal’s payoff that depends on T is given by the analog of (D.1) with the
simplification of β0 = 1:
























1− λH)t−1 − (1− λL)t−1]
 .
Hence, for any T ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}we have the following analog of (D.2):




1− λL)T (λL − c)− µ0 c
λL
(
1− λH)T (λH − λL)] .








(1− µ0) (λL − c)λL .
Since the left-hand side above is strictly increasing in T , it follows that V̂ (T ) is maximized by tL ∈ {0, T}.
Hence, whenever it is optimal to have the low type experiment for any positive amount of time, it is
optimal to have the low type experiment until T , no matter the value of T . Note that whenever exclusion
is optimal (i.e. tL = 0) when β0 = 1, it would also be optimal for all β0 ≤ 1; this follows from the
comparative static of tL with respect to β0 in Proposition 2.
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